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including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the
commons. I show that information about other players’ efforts increases the total
effort. Thus, the total effort is maximized with full transparency and minimized
with no transparency. I also study the advantages of moving earlier and the limits
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1 Introduction
Many economic interactions have contest-like structures, where payoffs are increasing
in players’ own efforts and decreasing in the total effort. Examples include oligopolies,
public goods provision, tragedy of the commons, rent seeking, R&D, advertising, and
sports. Most of the previous literature assumes that effort choices are simultaneous.
Simultaneous contests often have convenient properties: the equilibrium is unique, in
pure strategies, and is relatively easy to characterize.
In this paper, I study contests where the effort choices are not necessarily simultaneous.
In most real-life situations some players can observe their competitors’ efforts. Later
movers can respond appropriately to the choices earlier movers make. However, earlier
movers can anticipate these responses and affect the behavior of later movers. Each
additional period in a sequential contest adds a level of complexity, which might explain
why most of the previous work studies only simultaneous and two-period models. I
characterize equilibria for an arbitrary sequential contest and analyze how the information
about other players’ efforts affects the equilibrium behavior.
Contests may be sequential by nature or by design. Contest designers often can
choose how much information about players’ efforts to disclose. For example, in rent-
seeking contests, firms lobby to achieve market power. One tool that regulators can
use to minimize rent-seeking is to design a disclosure policy.1 A non-transparent policy
would lead to simultaneous effort choices, full transparency to a fully sequential contest,
and there may be potentially intermediate solutions such as revealing information only
occasionally. In research and development, the probability of a scientific breakthrough
may be proportional to research efforts, which are typically considered socially desirable.
The question is again how to organize the disclosure rules. A transparent policy could be
implemented as a public leaderboard or early working papers, whereas a non-transparent
policy would encourage teams to work in isolation.
I provide two main results. First, in the characterization theorem (Theorem 1) I
characterize all equilibria for any given disclosure rule. The standard backward-induction
approach requires finding best-response functions every period and substituting them
recursively. I show that this approach is not generally tractable, or even feasible. Instead,
I introduce an alternative approach, in which I characterize best-response functions by
their inverses. This allows me to pool all the optimality conditions into one necessary
1In the last decades, many countries have introduced new legislation regulating transparency in lobby-
ing, including the United States (Lobbying Disclosure Act, 1995; Honest Leadership and Open Govern-
ment Act, 2007), the European Union (European Transparency Initiative, 2005), and Canada (Lobbying
Act, 2008). However, there are significant cross-country differences in regulations—for example, in the
US, lobbying efforts must be reported quarterly, whereas in the EU, reporting is arranged on a more
voluntary basis and on yearly frequency.
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condition and solve the resulting equation just once. I prove that the equilibrium exists
and is unique, and I show how to compute it.
In my second main result (Theorem 2) I show that the information about other players’
efforts strictly increases the total effort. This means the optimal contest is always one of
the extremes. When efforts are desirable (as in R&D competitions) the optimal contest is
one with full transparency, whereas when the efforts are undesirable (as in rent-seeking),
the optimal contest is one with hidden efforts. The intuition behind this result is sim-
ple. Near the equilibrium, the efforts are strategic substitutes. Therefore, players whose
actions are disclosed have an additional incentive to exert more effort to discourage later
players. This discouragement effect is less than one-to-one near the equilibrium because
if players can increase their effort in a way that diminishes total effort, this provides them
with a profitable deviation.
The information about other players’ effort is important both qualitatively and quanti-
tatively. Under typical assumptions (Tullock contest payoffs), the sequential contest with
5 players ensures higher total effort than the simultaneous contest with 24. The differences
become even larger with larger contests. For example, a contest with 14 sequential players
achieves higher total effort than a contest with 16,000 simultaneous players. Therefore,
the information about other players’ efforts is at least as important as other characteristics
of the model, such as the number of players.
I also generalize the first-mover advantage result from Dixit (1987). Dixit showed
that a player who can pre-commit chooses greater effort and obtains a higher payoff
than the followers. The leader has two advantages: he moves earlier and has no direct
competitors. With the new characterization, I can explore this idea further and compare
players’ payoffs and efforts in an arbitrary sequential contest. I show that there is a strict
earlier-mover advantage—earlier players choose greater efforts and obtain higher payoffs
than later players.
I provide additional results for large contests. Although the characterization result
holds for any number of players, calculation of equilibrium becomes cumbersome with
large contests, especially when the number of periods becomes large. I show that there
is a convenient approximation method in which the equilibrium efforts can be directly
computed using a simple formula. This allows me to study the rates of convergence under
different disclosure policies. I show that the convergence is much faster in the case of
sequential versus simultaneous contests.
My results have applications in various branches of economic literature, including
oligopoly theory, contestability, rent-seeking, research and development, public goods
provision, and parimutuel betting. For example, they provide a natural foundation for
the contestability theory: if the moves are sequential, then a market could be highly
3
concentrated but still be very close to competitive equilibrium. The early players produce
most of the output and get most of the profits, but later players behave almost as an
endogenous competitive fringe by being ready to produce more as soon as earlier players
try to exploit their market power. Similarly, my results provide an explanation to a
paradox in the rent-seeking literature: to explain rent dissipation with strategic agents,
we need an unrealistically large number of players. I show that in a sequential rent-seeking
contest it is sufficient to have only a small number of players to achieve almost full rent
dissipation.
Literature: The simultaneous version of the model has been studied extensively in
many branches of the literature, starting from Cournot (1838). I use the Tullock contest as
my leading example. The literature on this type of contest was initiated by Tullock (1967,
1974) and motivated by rent-seeking (Krueger, 1974; Posner, 1975).2 Bell et al. (1976)
provided an axiomatization under which market shares are proportional to advertising
spending so that this model could be directly applied to advertising. The most general
treatment of simultaneous contests is provided by the literature on aggregative games
(Jensen, 2010; Acemoglu and Jensen, 2013; Martimort and Stole, 2012).3 My model is an
aggregative game only in the simultaneous case.
Two-period contests have also been studied extensively, starting with von Stackelberg
(1934), who studied quantity leadership in an oligopoly. In Tullock contests, the outcomes
in a two-player sequential contest coincide with that of a simultaneous contest (Linster,
1993). With more than two players, a first mover has a strict advantage (Dixit, 1987).4
Moreover, when the order of moves is endogenous, sequential contests arise in equilibrium
in both two-player Tullock contests (Leininger, 1993; Morgan, 2003) and in oligopoly
(Spence, 1977; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985; Anderson and Engers, 1992; Amir and Grilo,
1999).
Relatively little is known about contests with more than two periods. The only paper
I am aware of that has studied sequential Tullock contests with more than two periods
is Glazer and Hassin (2000), who characterized the equilibrium in the sequential three-
player Tullock contest. The only class of contests where equilibria are fully characterized
for sequential contests are oligopolies with linear demand (Daughety, 1990; Ino and Mat-
sumura, 2012; Julien et al., 2012). Linear demand implies quadratic payoffs; this is the
only case where the first-order conditions are linear in all variables and therefore the
2See Tullock (2001); Nitzan (1994); Konrad (2009) for literature reviews on contests.
3See Jensen (2017) for a literature review on aggregative games.
4In asymmetric contests even the two-player sequential contest differs from the simultaneous contest
(Morgan, 2003; Serena, 2017).
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equilibrium is simple to characterize.5
More is known about large contests. Perfect competition (Marshall equilibrium) is
a standard assumption in economics and it is important to understand its foundations.
Novshek (1980) showed that although under some assumptions the Cournot equilibrium
may not exist with a finite number of players, in large markets the Cournot equilib-
rium exists and converges to the Marshall equilibrium. Robson (1990) provided further
foundations for Marshall equilibrium by proving an analogous result for large sequential
oligopolies. In this paper, I take an alternative approach and under stronger assumptions
about payoffs I provide a full characterization of equilibria with any number of players and
any disclosure structure, which includes simultaneous and sequential contests as extremes.
This allows me not only to show that the large contest limit is Marshall equilibrium but
study the rates of convergence under any contest structures.
There are three somewhat distinct branches of literature on contests: Tullock contests,
all-pay contests, and tournaments.6 These three branches differ in terms of the contest
success function, i.e., the criteria for allocating prizes. First, in Tullock contests the
probabilities of receiving the prizes are proportional to efforts (Tullock, 1967, 1974, 2001).
In the static framework, they typically give unique equilibria, which is in pure strategies.
This model is often used to study rent-seeking, R&D races, advertising, and elections.
My model extends this class of models to sequential settings.
The second class of contests includes all-pay auctions and wars of attrition, where
the player with the highest effort always wins. These models are often used to study
lobbying, military activities, and auctions. The equilibria in this class are typically in
mixed strategies. Baye et al. (1996) characterize the equilibria in the static common-value
(first-price) all-pay auction and Hendricks et al. (1988) in the second-price all-pay auction
(also called the war of attrition). Siegel (2009) provides a general payoff characterization
for the static all-pay contests. The third class of contests is rank-order tournaments in
which prizes are allocated according to the highest output rather than the highest effort.
Output is a noisy measure of effort. Tournaments were introduced by Lazear and Rosen
(1981) and Rosen (1986) and are most often used to model principal-agent relationships
and contract design in personnel economics and labor economics. My assumptions exclude
all-pay contests and tournaments.
The paper also contributes to the contest design literature. Previous papers on contest
design include Glazer and Hassin (1988), Taylor (1995), Che and Gale (2003), Moldovanu
and Sela (2001, 2006), Olszewski and Siegel (2016), and Bimpikis et al. (2017), which
5However, linearity is a special assumption with perhaps undesirable consequences. For example,
the leader’s quantity in Stackelberg model with linear demand is independent of the number of followers
(Anderson and Engers, 1992). See appendix H for more detailed discussion of contests with linear payoffs.
6For detailed literature reviews, see Konrad (2009) and Vojnovic (2015).
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have focused on contests with private information. In this paper I study contest design
on a different dimension: how to disclose other players’ efforts optimally to minimize or
maximize total effort.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and discusses the
main assumptions. Section 3 discusses the difficulties with the standard solution method,
describes the approach introduced in this paper, and provides the characterization result.
Section 4 gives the second main result, the information theorem, which shows that the
total effort is increasing in information in a general sense. It also discusses the corollaries of
the result, including its implications for optimal contests. Section 5 studies earlier-mover
advantage and section 6 discusses large contests. Section 7 analyses applications and
policy implications of the results. Finally, section 8 concludes. All proofs are presented
in the appendixes.
2 Model
Players and timing: There are n identical players N = {1, . . . , n} who arrive to the
contest sequentially and make effort choices on arrival. At T−1 points in time, the sum of
efforts by previous players is publicly disclosed.7 These disclosures partition players into T
groups, denoted by I = (I1, . . . , IT ). In particular, all players in I1 arrive before the first
disclosure and therefore have no information about other players’ efforts. All players in
It arrive between disclosures t−1 and t and therefore have exactly the same information:
they observe the total effort of players arriving prior to disclosure t − 1. I refer to the
time interval in which players in group It arrived as period t. As all players are identical,
the disclosure rule of the contest is fully described by the vector n = (n1, . . . , nT ), where
nt = #It is the number of players arriving in period t.8
Efforts: I assume that each player i chooses an individual effort xi ≥ 0 at the time of
arrival. I denote the profile of effort choices by x = (x1, . . . , xn), the total effort in the
contest by X = ∑ni=1 xi, and the cumulative effort after period t by Xt = ∑ts=1∑i∈Is xi.
As the payoffs only depend on the sum of other players’ efforts, it is sufficient to keep
track of the cumulative effort, even if the players are able to observe individual efforts.
By construction, the cumulative effort before the contest is X0 = 0, and the cumulative
7The points of disclosure could be exogenous or chosen by a contest designer. In the following sections I
first characterize the equilibria of arbitrary contests with fixed disclosures and then study the relationship
between the equilibrium efforts and disclosures.
8Equivalently the model can be stated as follows: there are T time periods and n players are distributed
among these periods and either exogenously or by the contest designer.
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effort after period T is the total effort exerted during the contest, i.e. XT = X. Figure 1
summarizes the notation with an example of a four-period contest.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7
X1
X2 . . .
X4 = X
Figure 1: A contest with 7 players and 3 disclosures. Players 1 to 3 choose efforts x1, x2,
and x3 independently; player 4 observes X1 = x1+x2+x3, player 5 observes X2 = X1+x4,
and players 6 and 7 observe X3 = X2 + x5.
Payoffs: As the leading example of this paper I use normalized Tullock payoffs, with
ui(x) =
xi
X
− xi. (1)
This can be interpreted as a contest where players compete for prizes of total size one,
the probability of winning is proportional to efforts, and the marginal cost of effort is
one. Alternatively, this could be a model of an oligopoly with unit-elastic inverse demand
function P (X) = 1
X
and marginal cost c = 1, or a public goods provision (or tragedy of
the commons) with the marginal benefit of private consumption MB(X) = 1−X
X
.
Note that all of the results apply to a more general class of contests than Tullock
contests. As the proofs of the general results are analogous, it is useful to focus on the
example with Tullock payoffs first. I discuss general payoff functions in section 7.
Equilibrium concept: I study pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE), which
is a natural equilibrium concept in this setting: there is no private information and earlier
arrivals can be interpreted as having greater commitment power. I show that there always
exists a unique pure-strategy SPE.
Restrictive assumptions: Throughout this paper, I maintain a few assumptions that
simplify the analysis. First, there is no private information. Second, the arrival times
and the disclosure rules are fixed and common knowledge. Third, each player makes an
effort choice just once—on arrival. Fourth, disclosures make cumulative efforts public. In
section 8, I discuss the extent to which the results rely on each of these assumptions.
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3 Characterization
3.1 The problem with standard backward induction
Before describing the solution, let me use a simple example to illustrate the difficulty
of using the standard backward-induction approach. I will then describe the alternative
approach I introduce in this paper.
The standard Tullock contest with identical players is a simple game. If n players
make their choices in isolation, i.e., no information is revealed to them, then each player
i chooses effort xi simultaneously to maximize the payoff (1). The optimal efforts have
to satisfy the first-order condition
1
X
− xi
X2
− 1 = 0. (2)
Combining the optimality conditions leads to a total equilibrium effort X∗ = n−1
n
and
individual efforts x∗i = n−1n2 . The equilibrium is unique, in pure strategies, easy to compute,
and easy to generalize in various directions, which may explain the widespread use of this
model in various branches of economics.
Consider next a three-player version of the same contest, but the players arrive se-
quentially and their efforts are instantly publicly disclosed. That is, players 1, 2, and 3
make their choices x1, x2, and x3 after observing the efforts of previous players. I will first
try to find equilibria using the standard backward-induction approach.
Player 3 observes the total effort of the previous two players, X2 = x1 + x2 ∈ [0, 1)9
and maximizes the payoff (1), which in this case is
max
x3≥0
x3
X2 + x3
− x3.
The optimality condition for player 3 is
1
X2 + x3
− x3(X2 + x3)2 − 1 = 0 ⇒ x
∗
3(X2) =
√
X2 −X2. (3)
Now, player 2 observes x1 ∈ [0, 1) and knows x∗3(X2), and therefore maximizes
max
x2≥0
x2
x1 + x2 + x∗3(x1 + x2)
− x2 = max
x2≥0
x2√
x1 + x2
− x2.
9Players get non-positive payoffs in histories with X2 ≥ 1 or x1 ≥ 1, which cannot be an equilibrium.
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The optimality condition is
1√
x1 + x2
− x2
2(x1 + x2)
3
2
− 1 = 0.
For each x1 ∈ [0, 1), this equation defines a unique best-response,
x∗2(x1) =
1
12 − x1 +
(
8
√
27x31(27x1 + 1) + 216x21 + 36x1 + 1
) 2
3 + 24x1 + 1
12
(
8
√
27x31(27x1 + 1) + 216x21 + 36x1 + 1
) 1
3
. (4)
Finally, player 1’s problem is
max
x1≥0
x1
x1 + x∗2(x1) + x∗3(x1 + x∗2(x1))
− x1,
where x∗2(x1) and x∗3(X2) are defined by equations (3) and (4). Although the problem
is not complex, it is not tractable. Moreover, it is clear that the direct approach is not
generalizable for an arbitrary number of players.10 In fact, the best response function
typically does not have an explicit representation for contests with a larger number of
periods.11
3.2 Inverted best-response approach
In this paper I introduce a different approach. Instead of characterizing individual best-
responses x∗i (Xt−1) or the total efforts induced by Xt−1, denoted by X∗t−1(Xt−1), I charac-
terize the inverse of this function. For any level of total effortX, the inverted best-response
function ft−1(X) is the cumulative effort Xt−1 prior to period t, that is consistent with
total effort being X, given that the players in periods t, . . . , T behave optimally.
To see how this characterization works, consider the three-player sequential contest
again. In the last period, player 3 observes X2 and chooses x3. Equivalently we can
think of his problem as choosing the total effort X ≥ X2 by setting x3 = X − X2. His
maximization problem is
max
X≥X2
X −X2
X
− (X −X2) ⇒ 1
X
− X −X2
X2
− 1 = X2
X2
− 1 = 0,
10Glazer and Hassin (2000) characterized the equilibrium in the contest with three sequential players.
To my knowledge, no existing papers have characterized equilibria for sequential contests with more than
three periods.
11The representation from theorem 1 implies that best-response functions include roots of higher-order
polynomials that are not solvable (see appendix C for details). Therefore, the best-response functions
x∗i (Xt−1) cannot be expressed explicitly in terms of standard mathematical operations.
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which implies X2 = X2. That is, if the total effort in the contest is X, then before the
move of player 3, the cumulative effort had to be f2(X) = X2; otherwise, player 3 is not
behaving optimally.
We can now think of player 2’s problem as choosing X ≥ X1, which he can induce by
making sure that the cumulative effort after his move is X2 = f2(X), which means setting
x2 = f2(X)−X1. Therefore, his maximization problem can be written as
max
X≥X1
f2(X)−X1
X
− (f2(X)−X1) ⇒ f
′
2(X)
X
− f2(X)−X1
X2
− f ′2(X) = 0. (5)
This is the key equation to examine in order to see the advantages of the inverted best-
response approach. Equation (5) is non-linear in X and therefore in x2, which causes
the difficulty for the standard backward-induction approach. Solving this equation every
period for the best-response function leads to complex expressions, and the complexity
accumulates with each step of the recursion. But equation (5) is linear in X1, and it is
therefore easy to derive the inverted best-response function
f1(X) = X1 = f2(X)− f ′2(X)X(1−X) = X2(2X − 1).
Again, we know that if the total effort of the contest is X, then after player 1 the cu-
mulative effort has to be X1 = f1(X); otherwise, at least one of the later players is not
behaving optimally.
Moreover, note that X < 12 cannot be induced by any X1, as even if X1 = 0, the total
effort chosen by players 2 and 3 would be 12 . Inducing total effort below
1
2 would require
player 1 to exert negative effort, which is not possible. Therefore, f1(X) is defined over
the domain
[
1
2 , 1
]
, and it is strictly increasing in this interval.
Finally, player 1 maximizes a similar problem of choosing X ≥ 12 , which he can induce
by setting x1 = f1(X), to maximize
max
X≥ 12
f1(X)
X
− f1(X) ⇒ f
′
1(X)
X
− f1(X)
X2
− f ′1(X) = 0,
which implies
0 = f0(X) = f1(X)− f ′1(X)X(1−X) = X2(6X2 − 6X − 1). (6)
Solving equation (6) gives three candidates for the total equilibrium effort X∗. It is either
0, 12 − 12√3 , or 12 + 12√3 . As we already found that in equilibrium X∗ ≥ 12 , only the highest
10
root 12 +
1
2
√
3 ≈ 0.7887 constitutes an equilibrium.12
The main advantage of the inverted best-response approach is that instead of finding
the solution of a non-linear and increasingly complex equation, the approach allows for
combining all of the first-order necessary conditions into one, which is then solved only
once.
Note that in each period, there is a simple recursive dependence that determines
how the inverted best-response function evolves. At the end of the contest, i.e., after
period 3, the total effort is f3(X) = X. In each of the previous periods it is equal to
ft−1(X) = ft(X)− f ′t(X)X(1−X). Extending the analysis from three sequential players
to four or more sequential players is straightforward. It simply requires applying the same
rule more times and solving the somewhat more complex equation at the end.
3.3 Characterization theorem
Theorem 1 formalizes this approach, generalizes the result for more general payoff func-
tions, and allows for multiple players who make simultaneous decisions. It shows that each
contest n has a unique equilibrium. The total equilibrium effort X∗ is the highest root
of f0(X), and the individual equilibrium effort of player i from period t can be computed
directly as x∗i = 1nt [ft(X
∗)− ft−1(X∗)].
The characterization builds on the recursively defined inverted best-response functions
f0, . . . , fT , where Xt = ft(X) is the cumulative effort after period t, consistent with the
total effort in the contest being X. The total effort after the last period T is fT (X) = X,
and the cumulative efforts in all previous periods are recursively defined by
ft−1(X) = ft(X)− ntf ′t(X)g(X), ∀X ∈ [X t, 1],∀t = 1, . . . , T, (7)
where X t is the highest root of ft(X) = 0 in [0, 1] and g(X) = X(1−X).
The recursive rule is similar to the example, but with two natural differences. First,
it allows simultaneous decisions. When nt > 1 players make simultaneous decisions in
period t, then each of them has only a fractional impact on the best-responses of the
following players, which means that the impact on the inverted best-response function
is magnified by nt. Second, in the proof of the theorem, I allow more general payoff
functions, which are captured by function g(X).13
The first part of the proof shows that the inverted best-response functions are well-
behaved. As figure 2 illustrates, all of these functions take positive values 1 at X = 1,
12I did not check that the individual necessary conditions are also sufficient in this example, but in the
characterization result in the next section, I verify this for arbitrary contests.
13I discuss sufficient conditions on general payoffs in section 7.
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their highest roots X t are always in [0, 1) and decreasing in t (i.e., moving closer to 1
as t decreases). Moreover, each ft is strictly increasing between its highest roots and 1,
which means that in this relevant range it is invertible and therefore defines the best-
response function uniquely, and ft is strictly negative in the between the two consecutive
highest roots, i.e. [X t+1, X t), which excludes all the other candidates for equilibria. These
properties are formalized as condition 1.
X
ft(X)
X1
X0
Figure 2: Illustration of condition 1 in three-player sequential Tullock contest. Example:
for t = 0, we have (1) X0 ≈ 0.7887 > X1 = 0.5, (2) f0(X) < 0 for all X ∈ [X1, X0) (line
segment marked with circles), and (3) f0(X) is strictly increasing in [X0, 1] (line segment
marked with plusses). For calculations, see section 3.2.
Condition 1 (Inverted best responses are well-behaved). For all t = 0, . . . , T − 1, the
function ft has the following properties:
1. ft(X) = 0 has a root in [X t+1, 1].14 Let X t be the highest such root.
2. ft(X) < 0 for all X ∈ [X t+1, X t).
3. f ′t(X) > 0 for all X ∈ [X t, 1].
Moreover, X0 ∈ (0, 1).
The following proposition 1 shows that condition 1 is satisfied in case of Tullock payoffs.
Proposition 1. If g(X) = X(1−X), then condition 1 is satisfied.
14Function fT (X) = X has only one root XT = 0.
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The second part of the proof shows that the properties highlighted in condition 1
are sufficient for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, and the equilibrium is
characterized as described above. The idea of the proof is analogous to the example in
section 3.2.
Theorem 1 (Characterization theorem). Suppose condition 1 holds. Each contest n has
a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium strategy of player i in period t is15
x∗i (Xt−1) =

1
nt
[
ft(f−1t−1(Xt−1))−Xt−1
]
∀Xt−1 < 1,
0 ∀Xt−1 ≥ 1.
(8)
In particular, the total equilibrium effort is X∗ = X0, i.e., the highest root of f0(X) = 0,
and the equilibrium effort of player i ∈ It is x∗i = 1nt [ft(X∗)− ft−1(X∗)].
The characterization theorem provides a straightforward method for computing the
equilibria in any contest n. Appendix K provides several examples demonstrating how it
can be applied in the case of Tullock payoffs and other payoff functions.
4 Information and effort
In this section, I present the second of the two main result of this paper. I show that the
information increases total effort in contests. The result has strong implications for both
the comparative statics and for optimal contests.
Before giving the formal result, I need to introduce the notation to keep track of the
relevant information in contest n. Let me use a contest n = (1, 2, 1) to illustrate the
construction. This contest has four players: a first-mover, two simultaneous followers,
and a last-mover. At the most basic level, all players observe their own efforts (regardless
of the disclosure rule). There are n = 4 observations of this kind and they clearly affect
the outcomes of the contest. I call this the first level of information and denote as S1 = 4.
More importantly, some players directly observe the efforts of some other players. In the
example, players 2 and 3 observe the effort of player 1 and player 4 observes the efforts of
all three previous players. Therefore, there are five direct observations of other players’
efforts. I call this the second level of information and denote as S2 = 5. Finally, player 4
observes players 2 and 3 observing player 1. There are two indirect observations of this
kind, which I call the third level of information and denote as S3 = 2. In contests with
15Function f−1t (Xt) denotes the inverse function of ft(X) in the interval [Xt, 1], where Xt is the highest
root of ft in [0, 1]. By condition 1, ft(X) is strictly increasing in this interval.
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more periods, there would be more levels of information—observations of observations of
observations and so on.
I call a vector S(n) = (S1(n), . . . , ST (n)) the measure of information in a contest n.
In the example described above, S((1, 2, 1)) = (4, 5, 2). Formally, Sk(n) is the sum of all
products of k-combinations of set {n1, . . . , nT}.16 Note that we can also think of S(n) as
an infinite sequence with Sk = 0 for all k > T .
Theorem 2 shows that the total effort is strictly increasing in vector S(n). The key
step in proving this is showing that the inverted best-response function f0(X) can be
expressed as
f0(X) = X −
T∑
k=1
Sk(n)gk(X), (9)
where g1, . . . , gT are recursively defined as g1(X) = g(X) = X(1 − X) and gk+1(X) =
−g′k(X)g(X). Each gk(X) is independent of n and clearly Sk(n) is independent of X. As
the total equilibrium effort, X∗ is the highest root of f0; it therefore depends on n only
through information measures S(n).
Each gk describes the substitutability between efforts. In particular, if g2(X∗) > 0,
then the efforts are strategic substitutes near equilibrium in the standard sense, i.e., the
effort of an earlier player i discourages the effort of a later j player who observes player
i. If it is also the case that g3(X∗) > 0, then the indirect impact through observations of
observations also leads to discouragement, i.e., not only does player i discourage a later
player l directly, but if this player l moves after player j, then the indirect effect of player
i’s effort through player j on player l is discouraging. Similarly gk(X∗) > 0 describes the
discouragement effect through k-th level of information.17
In particular, a sufficient condition that guarantees X∗ is strictly increasing in S(n)
is that each gk(X∗) > 0, i.e., the efforts are higher-order strategic substitutes near equi-
librium, which is formalized by condition 2.
Condition 2 (Higher-order strategic substitutes). gk(X∗) > 0 for all k = 2, . . . , T .
In the case of Tullock payoffs, g(X) = X(1−X), which means that with low total effort
X < 12 , the efforts are strategic complements; with high total effort X >
1
2 , the efforts are
strategic complements; and in the knife-edge case X = 12 , they are independent. This is
why information about the first mover’s effort in the two-player Tullock contest does not
change the equilibrium efforts. Indeed, in both n = (2) and n̂ = (1, 1) the total effort is 12
and the individual efforts are 14 . I show that for any other contests the total equilibrium
16For example, in a sequential n-player contest n = (1, 1, . . . , 1), Sk(n) is simply the number of all
k-combinations, i.e., Sk(n) = n!k!(n−k)! .
17My assumptions also guarantee that g1(X∗) = g(X∗) > 0, i.e., individual effort discourages one’s
own effort, which is a standard concavity assumption that guarantees the interior optimum.
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effort is strictly higher than 12 and therefore, the efforts are strategic substitutes in the
standard sense.
As the following proposition shows, this observation generalizes to n-player contests.
The efforts are higher-order strategic substitutes for any contest except in the fully se-
quential case, where the highest gn(X∗) = 0. However, if there are at least three players,
this exception does not affect the conclusions because the fully sequential contest also
has strictly higher lower-level information measures than any other contest. For example,
when n = 3, S((1, 1, 1)) = (3, 3, 1), S((2, 1)) = S((1, 2)) = (3, 2) and S((3)) = (3), i.e.,
contest (1, 1, 1) has a strictly higher S2 than any other three-player contest.
Proposition 2. Suppose g(X) = X(1−X). Then
1. if n = (1, 1, . . . , 1) and k = T = n, then gk(X∗) = 0; otherwise,
2. if n 6= (1, . . . , 1) or k < T , then gk(X∗) > 0.
Now, if condition 2 holds, then the increase18 in S(n) would lower f0(X∗) near the
original equilibrium and therefore, due to condition 1, the total equilibrium effort must
increase. These arguments jointly imply the second main result of the paper, theorem 2.
It shows that the total equilibrium effort of any contest n only depends on the information
S(n) in the contest and is strictly increasing in each level of information.
Theorem 2 (Information theorem). Suppose conditions 1 and 2 hold. Total effort is a
strictly increasing function X∗(S(n)).
Therefore, information in contests defines a partial order over contests—if S(n̂) > S(n)
then X∗(S(n̂)) > X∗(S(n)). Theorem 2 has many direct implications. I highlight some
of the most important ones in the following corollaries. Note that these corollaries hold
whenever conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied, which includes all contests with Tullock payoffs
and at least three players.
Corollary 1. Under conditions 1 and 2
1. Comparative statics of n: if n̂ > n19, then S(n̂) > S(n) and therefore X∗(S(n̂))) >
X∗(S(n)).
2. Independence of permutations: if n̂ is a permutation of n, then S(n̂) = S(n) and
therefore X∗(S(n̂)) = X∗(S(n)).
3. Informativeness increases total effort: if Î is a finer partition than I, then S(n̂) >
S(n) and therefore X∗(S(n̂)) > X∗(S(n)).
18S(n̂) > S(n) means that Sk(n̂) ≥ Sk(n) for all k and Sk(n̂) > Sk(n) for at least one k.
19Including when nt = 0 < n̂t, i.e., n̂ has more periods with strictly positive number of players.
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4. Homogeneity increases total effort: if n̂ = n and there exist t, t′ such that n̂tn̂t′ >
ntnt′ and n̂s = ns for all s 6= t, t′, then S(n̂) > S(n) and therefore X∗(S(n̂)) >
X∗(S(n)).
5. Full dissipation in large contests: limn→∞X∗(S(n)) = 1.
The first implication is natural—if the number of players increases in any particular
period or a period with a positive number of players is added, then the total effort in-
creases. Note that this does not mean that the total effort is a strictly increasing function
of the number of players. For example, as we saw above, the three-player sequential Tul-
lock contest gives total effort 0.7887, whereas the four-player simultaneous Tullock contest
gives total effort 4−14 = 0.75. The conclusion only holds when we add players while keeping
the positions of other players unchanged, because this increases information.
The second implication is perhaps much more surprising—reallocating disclosures in
a way that creates a permutation of n (or equivalently, reordering periods together with
the corresponding players) does not affect the total effort. For example, a contest with a
first mover and n− 1 followers leads to the same total effort as a contest with n− 1 first
movers and one last mover. The result comes from the property that all observations of
the same level have the same impact on the total effort; i.e., it does not matter whether
k players observe one player or one player observes k players.
The third implication is perhaps the most important in terms of its consequences. It
shows that disclosures strictly increase total effort. In particular, adding disclosures makes
the contest strictly more informative: all players observe everything that they observed
before, but some observe the efforts of more players. Formally, the new contest is a finer
partition of players than the old contest.
To see the intuition of this result, consider contests n = (1, 2, 1) and n̂ = (1, 1, 1, 1).
Now, player 2’s effort is made visible for player 3. Therefore, in addition to all marginal
costs and benefits of effort, player 2 has an additional benefit of effort: as efforts are
strategic substitutes, exerting more effort discourages player 3. This discouragement effect
leads to added effort by player 2 and reduced effort by player 3, and the remaining question
is how these effects compare. Player 2’s payoff is u2(x) = x2h(X), where h(X) = 1X − 1 is
a strictly decreasing function of total effort, which means that if he could increase his own
effort without increasing the total effort, he would certainly do so and it would not be
an equilibrium. Therefore, near equilibrium we would expect the discouragement effect
to be less than one-to-one, i.e., player 2 exerts more effort and player 3 exerts less but
the total increases. Of course, this argument works only for small changes, keeping the
efforts of indirectly affected players 1 and 4 unchanged. However, since the efforts are
strategic substitutes of higher order, the indirect effects have the same signs and therefore
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the result still holds.
The fourth implication gives even clearer implications for the optimal contest. Namely,
more homogeneous contests give higher total effort. Intuitively, a contest is more homo-
geneous if its disclosures are spread out more evenly (or equivalently, players are divided
more evenly across periods). For example, a contest n̂ = (2, 2) is more homogeneous than
n = (1, 3). It has also more direct observations as 2×2 = 4 > 3 = 1×3. I define the more
homogeneous contest as one which can be achieved by pairwise increases of products of
group sizes while keeping everything else fixed. Therefore, by construction, it increases
S2 strictly and all other Sk measures weakly.
The final implication is that in large contests rents are fully dissipated. This result
follows from the fact that simultaneous contests are the least informative and give total
effort n−1
n
, which converges to 1 as n → ∞. Therefore, the total effort from any contest
converges to 1.20
These results give strong implications for the contest design, which I summarize in the
following corollary.
Corollary 2. Assume that conditions 1 and 2 hold and fix n. A simultaneous contest
n = (n) minimizes the total effort, and a fully sequential contest n = (1, 1, . . . , 1) maxi-
mizes the total effort. Moreover, if the contest designer can only make a fixed number of
disclosures21, then contests that allocate players into groups that are as equal as possible
maximize the total effort.
Therefore, if the goal is to minimize the total effort (such as in rent-seeking contests),
then the optimal policy is to minimize the available information, which is achieved by
a simultaneous contest. Transparency gives earlier players incentives to increase efforts
to discourage later players, but this discouragement effect is less than one-to-one and
therefore increases total effort.
On the other hand, if the goal is to maximize the total effort (such as in research and
development), then the optimal contest is fully sequential as it maximizes the incentives to
increase efforts through this discouragement effect. If the number of possible disclosures
is limited (for example, collecting or announcing information is costly), then it is better
to spread the disclosures as evenly as possible.22
Vector comparison S(n̂) > S(n) defines a partial order over contests. To complete
the order, we would have to know how to weigh different measures of information. Equa-
20This limit result is known in simultaneous contests since Novshek (1980) and (fully) sequential con-
tests since Robson (1990).
21Or equivalently, there is a fixed number of periods.
22It is easy to see that parts 2 and 4 of corollary 1 imply that the contest that maximizes total effort
with T−1 disclosures (T periods) and n players is such that there are T̂ = Tk−n periods with nt = dn/T e
players and T − T̂ periods with nt = bn/T c players.
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tion (9) provides a clue: the correct weights are gk(X∗); i.e., by magnitudes of discourage-
ment effects near equilibrium. Unfortunately, these weights are endogenous and generally
depend on a specific contest, but there are a few cases where we can say more.
I argue in section 6 that if the number of players is large, then gk(X∗) is approximately
αk(1 −X∗), with α = −g′(1) = 1 in Tullock payoffs case. Therefore, in large sequential
Tullock contests all measures of information are produced approximately equally, which
gives a complete order on contests: X∗(S(n̂)) > X∗(S(n)) if and only if ∑k Sk(n̂) >∑
k Sk(n).
However, with a smaller number of players, the following lemma shows that lower
information measures have a higher weight.
Lemma 1. For g(X) = X(1−X), for each k ≥ 2, gk−1(X∗) > gk(X∗).
For example, let us compare two 10-player contests n = (5, 5) and n̂ = (8, 1, 1). Then
S(n) = (10, 25) and S(n̂) = (10, 17, 8). The two contests cannot be ranked according to
the information measures, because the first contest n has more second-order information,
whereas the second contest n̂ has one more disclosure and thus more third-order infor-
mation. However, the sum of all information measures is 10 + 25 = 10 + 17 + 8 = 35.
Since the weights are higher in lower-order information, this implies that the total effort
is higher in the first contest. Indeed, direct application of the characterization theorem
confirms this, as X∗ = 13+
√
41
20 ≈ 0.9702 > X̂∗ = 31+
√
241
48 ≈ 0.9693.
5 Earlier-mover advantage
In this section, I revisit Dixit’s first-mover advantage result. Dixit showed that in a
contest with at least three players, if one player can pre-commit, this first mover chooses
a strictly higher effort and achieves a strictly higher payoff than the followers. Using the
tools developed in this paper, I can explore this idea further. Namely, in Dixit’s model,
the first mover has two advantages compared to the followers. First, he moves earlier, and
his action may impact the followers. Second, he does not have any direct competitors in
the same period.
I can now distinguish these two aspects. For example, what would happen if n − 1
players chose simultaneously first and the remaining player chose after observing their
efforts? Or more generally, in an arbitrary sequence of players, which players choose the
highest efforts and which ones get the highest payoffs? The answer to all such questions
turns out to be unambiguous. As proposition 3 shows, it is always better to move earlier.
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Proposition 3 (Earlier-mover advantage). Suppose conditions 1 and 2 hold. The efforts
and payoffs of earlier23 players are strictly higher than for later players.
Let us consider payoff comparisons first. Note that the equilibrium payoff of a player
i ∈ It is in the form ui(x∗) = x∗ih(X∗), and since X∗ is the same for all the players, payoffs
are proportional to efforts. Therefore, it suffices to show that the efforts of earlier players
are strictly higher. In the proof, I show that we can express the difference between the
efforts of players i and j from consecutive periods t and t+ 1 as
x∗i − x∗j =
T−t∑
k=1
[Sk(nt)− Sk(nt+1)]gk+1(X∗), (10)
where nt+1 = (nt+2, . . . , nT ) is the sub-contest starting after period t + 1 and nt =
(nt+1,nt+1) is the sub-contest starting after period t. Clearly, Sk(nt) > Sk(nt+1) for each
k = 1, . . . , T − t; i.e., there is more information on all levels in a strictly longer contest.
By condition 2, gk+1(X∗) > 0 for each k as well, and therefore the whole sum is strictly
positive.
The intuition of the result is straightforward: players in earlier periods are observed
by strictly more followers than the players from the later periods. Therefore, in addition
to the incentives that later players have, the earlier players have additional incentives to
exert more effort to discourage later players.
6 Large contests
In this section, I show that as the number of players becomes large, the total effort X∗
converges to 124 much faster in sequential contests than in simultaneous contests. Figure 3
illustrates that although all contest types X∗ converge to 1, the rate of convergence
depends significantly on the type of contest.
To compare the rates of convergence formally I need to discuss how to compute equi-
libria in large contests. Although the characterization theorem holds for an arbitrary
contest, since f0(X) is a polynomial of degree T + 1, its highest root may sometimes be
difficult to compute. In appendix H I show that the total equilibrium effort and individual
23By earlier I mean players who belong to the strictly earlier group, i.e., player i ∈ It is earlier than
j ∈ Is if and only if s < t.
24Corollary 1 showed that the total effort converges to 1 in any contest.
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nX∗
Figure 3: The total equilibrium effort in different contests with Tullock payoffs: fully
sequential nn = (1, . . . , 1), half & half nn = (dn/2e, bn/2c), single leader nn = (1, n− 1),
and simultaneous nn = (n).
equilibrium efforts with a large number of players can be approximated by25
1−X∗ ≈ 1
S(n) ≈
1∏T
t=1(1 + nt)
, x∗i ≈
1∏t
s=1(1 + ns)
,∀i ∈ It,∀t = 1, . . . , T. (11)
That is, the total equilibrium effort X∗ converges to a strictly increasing function of
S(n) = ∏Tt=1(1 + nt) − 1 = ∑Tk=1 Sk(n). Therefore, in large contests, information of all
degrees carries equal weight.
The reason for this result is simple. As the payoff function is smooth, it can be closely
approximated by a linear function. More precisely, payoffs are represented by function
g(X) = X(1−X). In large contests, the total effortX∗ ≈ 1, and therefore nearX∗ we have
that g1(X) = g(X) ≈ 1−X and −g′1(X) ≈ 1. This gives us g2(X) = −g′1(X)g(X) ≈ 1−X
and so on; i.e., each gk(X) ≈ 1−X near X∗ ≈ 1. Equation (9) can be approximated by
f0(X∗) ≈ 1− (1−X∗)S(n) = 0 ⇒ 1−X∗ ≈ 1
S(n) .
From (11) we can make a few observations. As already argued, all measures of in-
formation carry approximately equal weight in determining the total equilibrium effort.
Moreover, from (11) we see that the convergence 1−X∗ → 0 is with rate S(n). With simul-
taneous contests the sum of all levels of information is simply S(n) = S1(n) = n, so that
the convergence is linear. On the other extreme, with sequential contests n = (1, . . . , 1),
25In case of general payoff functions, if α = −g′(1) 6= 1, then these formulas are adjusted by a constant
α. See appendix H for details.
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we get that S(n) = ∏nt=1(1 + 1) − 1 = 2n − 1, so that the convergence is exponential.
When there are at most T periods, the rate of convergence is bounded by nT by the same
argument.
These results highlight the importance of information in contests. The information
provided is at least as important as the number of players in determining the total effort in
contests. For example, the total effort in the simultaneous contest with ten players is 0.9,
whereas the total effort with four sequential players is 0.9082. Adding a fifth sequential
player increases the total effort to 0.9587, and to achieve this in a simultaneous contest
with the same payoffs, we need 24 players. This comparison becomes even more favorable
for the sequential contests with a large number of players, as figure 4 illustrates.
n
Figure 4: Number of players in a sequential Tullock contest that leads to the same total
effort as a simultaneous Tullock contest with n players
For large contests, we can use the approximation from equation (11) to get a rela-
tionship between the number of players in simultaneous contests nsim and the number of
players in sequential contests nseq with approximately the same total revenue:
1
1 + nsim − 1 =
1
nsim
≈ 1−X∗ ≈ 1(1 + 1)nseq ⇒ n
sim ≈ 2nseq .
7 Applications
In this section, I discuss some implications of the results in the various branches of eco-
nomic literature. To apply the results to a wider range of applications, it is useful to note
that all the results presented in the earlier sections apply more generally than Tullock
payoffs. The approach and the results generalize to payoff functions in the form
ui(x) = xih(X), (12)
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where h(X) is a strictly decreasing function that satisfies sufficient conditions 1 and 2.
In particular, g(X) = − h(X)
h′(X) and α = −g′(1) > 0. Appendix I discusses the sufficient
conditions in detail and describes a class of payoff functions, where the conditions are
satisfied.26 Appendix K provides some examples of specific functional forms.
7.1 Oligopolies
In case of an oligopoly with a homogeneous product, the profit function of firm i is
ui(x) = xiP (X)− cxi = xih(X),
where xi is firm’s own quantity, X the total quantity, P (X) the inverse demand function,
and c the marginal cost of production, which is assumed to be constant and equal for
all firms. The simultaneous contest n = (n) is the standard Cournot oligopoly 27 and
n = (1, n − 1) is the Stackelberg quantity-leader model. In general, the model is a
hierarchical oligopoly model, where firms in earlier periods have more market power.
By theorem 1, the equilibrium exists and is unique, and the total equilibrium quantity
is always below X.28 Proposition 3 shows that earlier firms produce strictly more and earn
strictly higher profits than the later firms. Corollary 2 shows that the market structure
that maximizes total quantity is fully sequential and the market structure that minimizes
is simultaneous (Cournot).
The social planner maximizes the total surplus
S(X) =
∫ X
0
(P (t)− c)dt =
∫ X
0
h(t)dt. (13)
The surplus is maximized at X and is strictly increasing in X below that. By theorem 2
the total equilibrium quantity is strictly increasing in information in this range; therefore,
the socially optimal oligopoly would be fully sequential.29
For the firms, this outcome is not as appealing. The total profit of all firms is
U(X) =
n∑
i=1
ui(x) =
n∑
i=1
xi(P (X)− c) = Xh(X). (14)
26A program that verifies condition 1 and, if it is satisfied, computes the equilibrium for any contest is
available at http://toomas.hinnosaar.net/contests/.
27In the case of Tullock payoffs, it is also known as the Cournot-Puu oligopoly after Puu (1991).
28The threshold X is determined by as h(X) = 0 or equivalently P (X) = c, so it can be interpreted as
the Marshall equilibrium quantity. It can be normalized to X = 1 without loss of generality.
29This implication has been studied in an oligopoly with linear demand and constant marginal costs
by Daughety (1990).
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The joint profit maximization would lead to optimality condition
dpi(X)
dX
= h(X) +Xh′(X) = h′(X) [X − g(X)] = 0, (15)
where g(X) = − h(X)
h′(X) ; so the monopoly’s optimal total quantity satisfies X
m = g(Xm).
The joint profit is strictly decreasing in X > Xm. Equation (9) and condition 2 imply that
the total equilibrium quantity X∗ > Xm regardless of market structure, and therefore,
a collusive agreement would choose a market structure that minimizes X∗, which is the
simultaneous contest (Cournot).
In practice, we may think of quantity competition as capacity competition.30 The
results in this paper imply that credible commitments to large capacities may lead to
larger total capacity and thus to lower prices and higher welfare. Pre-commitments to
large capacities allow discouraging capacity investments by the later movers. Since this
discouragement effect is less than one-to-one, i.e., increased earlier-mover capacity is not
fully canceled out through capacity reduction by later movers, the pre-commitments in-
crease total capacity. Kalyanaram et al. (1995) survey the widespread empirical evidence
that a negative relationship exists between brands’ entry to the market and market share.
The negative relationship holds in many mature markets, including pharmaceutical prod-
ucts, investment banks, semiconductors, and drilling rigs. For example, Bronnenberg
et al. (2009) studied brands of typical consumer packaged goods and found a significant
early entry advantage. The advantage is strong enough to drive the rank order of market
shares in most cities.
7.2 Contestability
The theory of contestability (Baumol, 1982; Baumol et al., 1988) is widely used in practice;
it postulates that with frictionless reversible entry, a market may be concentrated and
contestable at the same time. In particular, if firms have no entry and exit barriers,
no sunk costs, and access to the same technology, then the market is contestable. In
a contestable market, firms operate at a zero-profit level, regardless of the number of
incumbent firms in the market. The reason is that when they would try to use their
dominance to extract rents, the competitive fringe would enter for a short period, undercut
them, and capture the extra rents. Therefore, the theory postulates that the threat of
entry works as a disciplining device, and that firms operate at zero profits.
This theory has been widely used, but also criticized (Brock, 1983; Shepherd, 1984;
Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1988; Gilbert, 1989), partly because it is sensitive to even small
30This idea was formalized by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983).
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sunk costs and partly because it requires the existence of a competitive fringe that is not
observed in equilibrium.
The results in this paper provide a natural foundation for contestability. As a bench-
mark, a competitive equilibrium would mean a large number of identical players who each
choose low quantities. In contrast, in a fully sequential contest, we need a much lower
number of firms to achieve the same total quantity and the individual behavior is very
different. The first firm chooses a quantity which is about α1+α of the total quantity.
31 The
second firm chooses α(1+α)2 and so on. Therefore, the market is highly concentrated
32 and
the first few firms have significant market power which they use to achieve higher profits
than the followers. However, the market is quite competitive and this competitiveness
comes from the later players. They produce very little in equilibrium, but as soon as ear-
lier players deviate to lower quantities, the later players respond with higher quantities.
Therefore, they act as a competitive fringe but in a standard oligopoly model. In this
paper, I do not include fixed costs and entry decisions, but it would be straightforward
to extend the analysis in this direction and endogenize the number of players.33
7.3 Rent dissipation in rent-seeking
Early papers by Tullock (1967), Krueger (1974), and Posner (1975) proposed that com-
petitive rent-seeking leads to full dissipation of rents. However, strategic modeling of
rent-seeking (Tullock, 1974, 2001) showed that strategic behavior leads to rent underdis-
sipation.
As the results in this paper show, the significant underdissipation result may be an
implication of mainly focusing on simultaneous rent-seeking contests. As discussed in
section 6, it suffices to have 5–10 players in a sequential rent-seeking contest to achieve
outcomes that are very close to full dissipation, whereas in a simultaneous contest the
same outcomes are achieved with a very high number of players.34
7.4 Research and development
Closely related models have been used to study patent races. The classic models, such as
Loury (1979) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), assume that n firms compete to innovate.
31In the Tullock payoffs case α = −g′(1) = 1, so the first player’s quantity is about 12 of the total.
32Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is HHI ≈ α2(1+α)2−1 . With Tullock payoffs, HHI ≈ 13 . For any α ≥ 12 ,
HHI ≥ 15 , which is a highly concentrated market. In contrast, in a simultaneous contest, HHI ≈ 0.33The observation that high concentration does not necessarily coincide with low competitiveness has
been made by Demsetz (1968), Daughety (1990), Ino and Matsumura (2012) among others.
34According to Murphy et al. (1993), rent-seeking activities exhibit increasing returns, which means
that the differences between simultaneous and sequential behavior may be magnified even further.
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Each firm chooses lump-sum investment xi, and its probability of making a discovery
on or before time t is 1 − e−ρ(xi)t with some hazard ρ(x) that is constant over time and
increasing and concave function of investment. The probability that a firm makes a
discovery at time t is therefore ∑nj=1 ρ(xj)e−∑nj=1 ρ(xj)t, and the conditional probability
that it is the firm i who makes the discovery is ρ(xi)∑n
j=1 ρ(xj)
. The first firm that innovates
gets a patent with value v, discounted at rate r, and the payoff of the other firms is
normalized to 0. Therefore, the expected payoff of firm i is
pii(x) =
∫ ∞
0
vρ(xi)e−
∑n
j=1 ρ(xj)te−rtdt− xi. (16)
If the hazard rate is a linear function of x, i.e., ρ(x) = ax and firms are very patient, i.e.,
r →∞, we get Tullock payoffs
pii(x) = v
ρ(xi)∑n
j=1 ρ(xj)
− xi = v xi∑n
j=1 xj
− xi. (17)
Therefore, the patent race game is strategically equivalent to Tullock contest with patient
firms.35
It is natural to ask what changes if instead of making the investment decisions si-
multaneously, some firms observe the investments made by some of their opponents.36
Suppose that the firms enter the market over time (in deterministic order) and at some
(again deterministic) points of time the current total investments are made public. Then,
if the firms are very patient, these initial timing changes do not affect the expected pay-
offs, and the expected payoff of firm i is still given by (17). However, the earlier firms
have a strategic impact on the investments of later firms. We can apply the results from
this paper to characterize equilibrium investments. Moreover, we know that the total
investments to R&D are strictly increasing in information provided to the firms and that
earlier firms choose higher investments and expect higher profits.
There is some empirical evidence of behavior along these lines. For example, in case of
new product introductions, Dranove and Gandal (2003) provided evidence that product
pre-announcements had a significant impact on the outcomes of DVD standards.
35This equivalence was first proven by Baye and Hoppe (2003).
36Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) discuss a similar extension, but with full commitment and ability to
revise decisions. In this case, the first firm to enter is a monopolist and all other firms stay inactive. In
the event they choose a positive investment, the monopolist is committed to increasing investment to a
very high level, which deters any additional entry. They do not discuss subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.
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7.5 Public goods provision
Suppose each player i has resource wi that she can divide between private consumption xi
and contribution to public good gi. The payoff of player i is as in Romano and Yildirim
(2005)37:
ui(x,g) = xiB(G), G =
n∑
i=1
gi, (18)
where B(G) is the marginal benefit of private consumption, which depends on public good
provision (rule of law, public amenities, etc.). Then G = ∑ni=1wi −∑ni=1 xi = W − X.
We can thus denote h(X) = B(W −X) and apply the results in this paper.
The social planner would maximize total payoff ∑i ui = Xh(X). By the same argu-
ments as before, he would then choose disclosures that minimize total private consumption
X∗, which implies the simultaneous choices. Allowing players to publicly commit to de-
cisions would lead to earlier players choosing high quantities of private consumption and
therefore to free-riding on later players.
7.6 Parimutuel betting
Parimutuel betting (or pool betting)38 has been studied both as a model of a marketplace
that aggregates information39 and as a field experiment that highlights cognitive biases40.
There is also an extensive literature on equilibrium behavior in parimutuel betting.41
To make a connection to my model, let me assume that there are a number of potential
bets (a classical example is betting on horses). In particular, n bettors consider making a
particular bet. As in the rest of the paper, I assume that there is no private information,
i.e., those n players all believe that the bet wins with probability p. The total pool is the
sum of their bets X = ∑ni=1 xi plus the expected sum of all other bets, denoted by Y . If
their bet wins, then the pool X + Y is divided proportionally to their bets; otherwise,
they lose their bets. Then, the expected payoff of player i is
ui(x, Y ) = p
xi
X
(X + Y )− xi = xi
X
pY − (1− p)xi, (19)
which is a Tullock payoff function with prize v = pY and marginal cost 1− p.
37They studied a two-player version of this application, but under more general assumptions.
38I am grateful to Marco Ottaviani for suggesting this application.
39For example, recently Gillen et al. (2017) documented a field experiment Intel Corporation that
used a parimutuel-like mechanism to aggregate information about the beliefs within the company and to
forecast the outcomes. They found that the forecasts from the mechanism were more accurate than the
benchmark forecasts.
40See Thaler and Ziemba (1988) for an overview.
41For example, Ottaviani and Sørensen (2009) show that the often-documented favorite-longshot bias
may arise as an equilibrium behavior with rational, privately informed bettors.
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My results imply that the total bet on X is increasing in the information provided to
bettors about the other bets. It is minimized if players make their bets independently
and maximized if the current pool is public.
Empirical work by Lemus and Marshall (2017) found that in prediction contests the
disclosure rule has a significant impact on the outcomes—providing more information
about other players’ choices reduces overall participation but increases the upper tail
of the distribution, and thus improves overall outcomes. These results provide some
confirmation of my model’s predictions, where disclosures incentivize the effort of earlier
movers, reduce the payoffs of later movers, and increase the total equilibrium effort.
8 Discussion
In this paper, I characterize equilibria for all sequential contests and study their properties.
Each contest has a unique equilibrium; it is in pure strategies and simple to compute.
The calculation only requires finding the highest root of a recursively defined function.
The total equilibrium effort is strictly increasing in information in a general sense. This
implies that the simultaneous contest minimizes the total effort and the fully sequential
contest maximizes it. There is an earlier-mover advantage: players in earlier periods exert
strictly greater effort and obtain strictly higher payoffs than players in later periods. As
the number of players increases, total effort converges to the perfectly competitive value in
all contests. The convergence is linear in the case of simultaneous contests and exponential
in the case of fully sequential contests.
Some of the assumptions made for tractability here can be relaxed. First, I assume
that the efforts are made public after each period. It is natural to ask whether players
would want to hide their efforts. The answer in the setting studied here is that they would
not. In a more general model, where players can make both public efforts (those studied
above) and hidden efforts (those known only to themselves), all efforts would be public
and therefore the equilibrium would remain unchanged.
Second, I assume that each player exerts effort only during the arrival period. Another
natural extension is to study a setting where players can exert efforts multiple times
following their arrival. Although making this argument formally requires more notation
and a more careful analysis, there is no reason to expect the results to change. To see this,
suppose that at the end of the contest all players have a chance to add to their previous
efforts. Then again, each player can choose whether to make an effort publicly at arrival
or secretly at the end. And since they can discourage the opponents by making public
efforts, they don’t hide their efforts. Yildirim (2005) and Romano and Yildirim (2005)
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proved a similar result in a more general model with two players.42 Leininger and Yang
(1994) showed that when players can react infinitely many times, it allows collusion to
emerge in equilibrium.
Third, although the payoff structure in this model is quite general, it assumes linearity
in players’ own efforts and makes specific assumptions about the marginal benefit function.
Relaxing this structure is not straightforward. I use both assumptions extensively in the
characterization, and without these assumptions, it would be more difficult to determine
an explicit characterization of equilibria. However, all results (with the exception of
independence of permutations in corollary 1) are with strict inequalities, so I would expect
the results to be robust to small perturbations in the assumptions, at least within some
small range of parameter values.
Fourth, I assumed symmetry and no private information. It is well-known in the liter-
ature43 that with private information there are no general closed-form characterizations of
equilibria in these types of contests.44 Note that it is not crucial for the contest designer
to know the payoffs exactly since most of the results hold for any payoffs satisfying the
sufficient conditions. The approach is generalizable to asymmetric (and publicly known)
payoffs and entry costs but is beyond the scope of this paper.
Fifth, I assume that disclosures are public, which means that later players observe
the sum of the efforts of more competitors than earlier players. This, combined with
the assumption that there is no private information, means that no signaling or learning
exists in this model. In particular, if the designer had an option for targeted disclosures,
it would extend the possibilities significantly.
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Appendices for online publication
A Tullock payoffs satisfy condition 1 (proposition 1)
Before proving proposition 1, let me briefly describe its key idea. The function ft+1 is
a polynomial, of degree r = T − t, so it can have at most r roots. By keeping track of
all the roots, I show by induction that all r roots are real and in [0, 1), with the highest
being X t+1. Therefore, all r − 1 roots of the derivative f ′t are also real and in [0, X t+1).
Evaluating ft at X t+1 and 1, we get
ft(X t+1) = ft+1(X t+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−nt+1 f ′t+1(X t+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
X t+1(1−X t+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0
ft(1) = ft+1(1)− nt+1f ′t+1(1) 1(1− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= ft+1(1) = · · · = fT (1) = 1 > 0.
This implies that ft must have a root X t ∈ (X t+1, 1). Moreover, since the highest root
of its derivative is again below X t, it is strictly increasing in [X t, 1]. Finally, I show that
the second highest root of ft is strictly below X t+1, so that ft(X) < 0 for all [X t+1, X t).
Proving this requires keeping track of all the roots.
Proof of proposition 1. First note that fT (X) = X is a polynomial of degree 1 and each
step of the recursion adds one degree, so ft(X) is a polynomial of degree T +1− t, which
I denote by r for brevity. The following two technical lemmas describe the values of the
polynomials ft at 1 and the number of roots at 0.
Lemma 2. ft(1) = 1 for all t = 0, . . . , T .
Proof. ft−1(1) = ft(1)− ntf ′t(1)1(1− 1) = ft(1) = fT (1) = 1.
Lemma 3. ft(0) = 0 for all t = 0, . . . , T . Depending on n, there could be either one or
two roots at zero:
1. If ns = 1 for some s > t, then ft(X) has exactly two roots at zero.
2. Otherwise, i.e., if ns 6= 1 for all s > t, then ft(X) has exactly one root at zero.
Proof. As ft(X) is a polynomial of degree r = T + 1− t, it can be expressed as
ft(X) =
r∑
s=0
ctsX
s ⇒ f ′t(X) =
r∑
s=1
ctssX
s−1,
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where ct0, . . . , ctr are the coefficients. Therefore,
ft−1(X) = ct0+ct1(1−nt)+
r∑
s=2
[
cts(1− snt) + ntcts−1(s− 1)
]
Xs+ntctT+1−t(T+1−t)XT+2−t.
As fT (X) = X, we have that cT0 = 0 and so ct0 = 0 for all t. Therefore, each ft has at least
one root at 0. Next, ft−1(X) has two roots at zero if and only if ct−11 = ct1(1 − nt) = 0.
This can happen only if either ct1 = 0 (i.e., ft(X) has two roots at zero) or nt = 1. As
fT (X) = X, we have that cT1 = 1 and therefore, ft(X) does indeed have two roots at zero
if and only if ns = 1 for some s > t.
Finally, ft−1(X) would have three roots at zero only if ct−12 = ct−11 = 0 = ct−10 . This
would require that ct−12 = ct2(1 − 2nt) + ntct1 = ct2(1 − 2nt) = 0. Since 2nt 6= 1, this
can happen only when ct2 = 0. But note that fT−1(X) = nTX2 − (1 − nT )X, so that
cT−12 = nT 6= 0. Therefore, ft(X) cannot have more than two roots at zero.
Lemma 4. The leading coefficient of ft is (T − t)!∏Ts=t+1 ns > 0.
Proof. Using the same notation as in lemma 3, the leading coefficient of ft−1(X) is ct−1r+1 =
rntc
t
r = r!
∏T
s=t ns.
Now I can proceed with the proof of proposition 1 itself. The proof uses that fact
that the ft is a polynomial of degree r = T + 1− t and keeps track of all of its roots. In
particular, it can be expressed as
ft(X) = ct
r∏
s=1
(X −Xs,t), (20)
where ct > 0 is the leading coefficient and X1,t, . . . , Xr,t are the r roots. By lemma 3,
either one or two of these roots are equal to zero. I show by induction that all other roots
are distinct and in (0, 1).
Let us consider the case of a single zero root first, i.e., assume that 0 = X1,t < X2,t <
. . . < Xr,t < 1. We can express the derivative of ft as
f ′t(X) = ct
r∑
i=1
∏
s6=i
(X −Xs,t).
Therefore, at root Xj,t, the polynomial f ′t(X) takes value
f ′t(Xj,t) = ct
∏
s 6=j
(Xj,t −Xs,t). (21)
In particular, at the highest root, f ′t(Xr,t) > 0, and at the second highest f ′t(Xr−1,t) < 0;
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therefore, f ′t must have a root Yr−1,t ∈ (Xr−1,t, Xr,t). By the same argument, there must
be a root Ys,t of f ′t between each of the two adjacent distinct roots of ft. As f ′t is a
polynomial of degree r− 1, this argument implies that all the roots of f ′t are distinct and
such that
X1,t = 0 < Y1,t < X2,t < Y2,t < · · · < Xr−1,t < Yr−1,t < Xr,t < 1.
In particular, sgn f ′t(Xs,t) = sgn ft(Ys,t) for all s ∈ {1, . . . , r− 1}. Next, note that ft(1) =
1 > 0 and, as the highest root of f ′t is Yr−1,t < Xr,t, this implies f ′t(Xr,t) > 0, and so
ft−1(Xr,t) = ft(Xr,t)− ntf ′t(Xr,t)Xr,t(1−Xr,t) < 0.
Therefore, ft−1 must have a root Xr+1,t−1 ∈ (Xr,t, 1). Now, for each s ∈ {2, r − 1}
ft−1(Ys,t) = ft(Ys,t) and ft−1(Xs,t) = −ntf ′t(Xs,t)Xs,t(1−Xs,t).
Hence, sgn ft−1(Ys,t) = sgn ft(Ys,t) = sgn f ′t(Xs,t) = −ft−1(Xs,t). This means that ft−1
must have a root Xs+1,t−1 ∈ (Xs,t, Ys,t). This argument determines r− 2 distinct roots in
(X2,t, Yr−1,t). By lemma 3, ft−1 also has at least one root X1,t−1 = 0.
We have therefore found 1+r−2−1 = r distinct real roots of ft−1 that is a polynomial
of degree r + 1. Thus, the final root X2,t must also be real. By lemma 3, if nt = 1,then
the ft−1 must have two roots at zero; so, X2,t = 0. Let us consider the remaining case
where nt > 1. By lemma 3, X2,t 6= 0. To determine its location, consider the function
fXt−1(X) = ft−1(X)/X. Note that
fXt (X) =
ft(X)
X
= ct
∏
s>0
(X −Xs,t)⇒ fXt (0) = ct
∏
s>0
(−Xs,t)
and
f ′t(0) = ct
∏
s>0
(−Xs,t).
Therefore,
fXt−1(0) = fXt (0)− ntf ′t(0)(1− 0) = ct
∏
s>0
(−Xs,t) [1− nt] = f ′t(0) [1− nt] .
We assumed that nt > 1; so, sgn fXt−1(0) = − sgn f ′t(0). Evaluating the function sgn fXt−1
at Y1,t gives
sgn fXt−1(Y1,t) = sgn ft(Y1,t) = sgn f ′t(X1,t) = − sgn fXt−1(0).
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Hence, fXt−1 must have a root X2,t−1 ∈ (0, Y1,t). As ft−1(X) = XfXt−1(X), it must be a
root of ft−1 as well. We have therefore located all r+1 roots of ft−1, which are all distinct
in this case.
Let us now get back to the case where ft had two roots at zero. By the same argument
as above, there must be a root of f ′t between each positive root of ft. As there are r − 2
positive roots, this determines r−3 distinct positive roots of f ′t . It is also clear that f ′t must
have exactly one root at zero. Polynomial f ′t has r−1 roots, and we have determined that
r− 2 of them are real and distinct. Thus, the remaining root must be real. To determine
its location, using the above approach, let fX′t (X) =
f ′t(X)
X
. Then as f ′t(Xr,t) > 0, we have
fX
′
t (Xr,t) > 0. Similarly, fX
′
t (Xr−1,t) < 0, and so on. In particular, fX
′
t (X3,t) < 0 if r is
even, and fX′t (X3,t) > 0 if r is odd. Now,
fX
′
t (0) = 2ct
∏
s>2
(−Xs,t),
which is strictly positive if r is odd and strictly negative if r is even, so that sgn fX′t (0) =
− sgn fX′t (X3,t). Hence, fX′t must have a root Y2,t ∈ (0, X3,t). Clearly this Y2,t is also a
root of f ′t(X) = XfX
′
t (X). Now we have found all r − 1 roots of polynomial f ′t and
X1,t = Y1,t = X2,t = 0 < Y2,t < X3,t < . . . < Xr−1,t < Yr,t < Xr,t.
Again, sgn f ′t(Xs,t) = sgn ft(Ys,t) for all s ∈ {2, . . . , r − 1}.
By the same arguments as above, ft−1 has a root Xr+1,t−1 ∈ (Xr,t, 1) and r − 3 roots
Xs+1,t−1 ∈ (Xs,t, Ys,t) for each s ∈ {3, r− 1}. Also, by lemma 3, ft−1 must have two roots
at zero. Therefore, we have determined 1 + r − 3 + 2 = r roots of ft−1, and so the final
root must also be real. The argument for determining this root is similar to the previous
case. Let fX2t−1(X) =
ft−1(X)
X2 . Then
fX
2
t−1(X) = fX
2
t (X)− ntfX
′
t (X)(1−X).
Therefore,
fX
2
t−1(0) = ct
∏
s>2
(−Xs,t)(1− 2nt),
so that sgn fX2t−1(0) = − sgn fX′t (0). Also,
fX
2
t−1(Y2,t) = fX
2
t (Y2,t).
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Since Y2,t > 0 and X3,t > 0 = X2,t, we have that
sgn fX2t−1(Y2,t) = sgn fX
2
t (Y2,t) = sgn ft(Y2,t) = − sgn ft(Y3,t)
= − sgn f ′t(X3,t) = − sgn fX
′
t (X3,t) = sgn fX
′
t (0) = − sgn fX
2
t−1(0).
Therefore, fX2t−1 must have a root in (0, Y2,t) which must also be a root of ft−1. Again, we
have found all r + 1 roots of ft−1.
In all cases, we found that
1. Xr+1,t−1 ∈ (Xr,t, 1); i.e., indeed the highest root of ft−1 is between the highest root
of ft and 1.
2. [Xr,t, Xr+1,t−1) ⊂ (Xr,t−1, Xr+1,t−1), so that ft−1(X) < 0 for all X ∈ [Xr,t, Xr+1,t−1).
3. By the same argument as above (or by the Gauss-Lucas theorem), Xr+1,t−1 > Yr,t−1,
so that f ′t−1(X) > 0 for all X ∈ [Xr+1,t−1, 1].
B Characterization theorem (theorem 1)
Proof of theorem 1. Let X∗t(Xt) denote the total effort in the contest, if the cumulative
effort after period t is Xt and players in periods t + 1, . . . , T behave according to their
equilibrium strategies. I show by induction that X∗t(Xt) = f−1t (Xt), which is defined as a
mapping from [0, 1] to [X t, 1], the region where ft is strictly increasing. These statements
are clearly true for X∗T (XT ) = XT .
Let us take any t < T . The cumulative effort prior to period t is Xt−1 and Xt =
Xt−1 +
∑
i∈It xi after period t. So, the total effort is X∗t(Xt) = f
−1
t (Xt), which is by
the induction assumption such that X∗t(0) = X t, X∗t(1) = 1, and dX
∗t(Xt)
dXt
> 0 for all
Xt ∈ [0, 1].
The rest of the proof is divided into five lemmas as follows:
1. Lemma 5 shows that in all histories where Xt−1 < 1, each player in period t chooses
strictly positive effort, but these added efforts in period t are small enough so that
the cumulative effort after period t remains strictly below one, Xt < 1. On the other
hand, in histories where Xt−1 ≥ 1, the players in period t exert no effort. Therefore,
on the equilibrium path Xt < 1 for all t.
2. Lemma 6 shows that Xt−1 = ft−1(X) is a necessary condition for equilibrium.
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3. Lemma 7 shows that under condition 1, X∗t−1(Xt−1) is well-defined and strictly
increasing, X∗t−1(0) = X t−1 and X∗t−1(1) = 1.
4. Lemma 8 shows that the best-response function of player i ∈ It after cumula-
tive effort Xt−1 is x∗i (Xt−1) = 1nt
[
ft(f−1t−1(Xt−1))−Xt−1
]
for all Xt−1 < 1 and
x∗i (Xt−1) = 0 for all Xt−1 ≥ 0. On the equilibrium path the individual efforts
are x∗i = 1nt [ft(X
∗)− ft−1(X∗)].
5. Finally, lemma 9 verifies that the unique candidate for equilibrium, i.e., x∗ specified
in the theorem, is indeed an equilibrium.
Lemma 5. Depending on Xt−1, we have two cases:
1. If Xt−1 < 1, then xi > 0 for all i ∈ It and Xt−1 < Xt < 1.
2. If Xt−1 ≥ 1, then xi = 0 for all i ∈ It and Xt = Xt−1 ≥ 1.
In other words, if period t starts with cumulative effort Xt−1 < 1, the players exert
strictly positive efforts, but the cumulative effort stays below 1. On the other hand, if
the cumulative effort is already Xt−1 ≥ 1, then all players choose zero effort and therefore
Xt = Xt−1 ≥ 1. A straightforward implication of this lemma is that the total effort never
reaches 1 or above in equilibrium, and the individual efforts on the equilibrium path are
always interior (i.e., strictly positive).
Proof. If Xt−1 ≥ 1, then if any player i in period t chooses xi > 0, then Xt > 1 and
therefore X∗t(Xt) ≥ Xt > 1, which means that ui(x) = xih(X∗t(Xt)) < 0. Since player i
can ensure zero payoff by choosing xi = 0, this is a contradiction. So, x∗i (Xt−1) = 0 for
all Xt−1 ≥ 1 and thus Xt = Xt−1 ≥ 1.
Now, take Xt−1 < 1. Suppose by contradiction that it leads to X∗t−1(Xt−1) ≥ 1. This
implies that in some period s ≥ t players chose efforts such that Xs−1 < 1, but Xs ≥ 1.
This means that one or more of these players i ∈ Is chose xi > 0 and gets a payoff of
ui(x) = xih(X∗s(Xs−1 +
∑
j∈Is xj)) ≤ 0. Now, there are two cases. First, if X∗s(Xs−1 +∑
j∈Is xj) > 1, then player i’s payoff is strictly negative, and the player could deviate and
choose xi = 0 to ensure zero payoff. On the other hand, if X∗s(Xs−1 +
∑
j∈Is xj) = 1,
which means that Xs = 1, then player i could choose effort xi2 , thus making Xs < 1 and
therefore X∗s(Xs) < 1, ensuring a strictly positive payoff. In both cases we arrive at a
contradiction. Thus Xt−1 < 1 implies Xt < 1 and X∗t(Xt) < 1.
The last step is to show that Xt−1 < 1 implies xi > 0 for all i ∈ It. Suppose that this
is not true, so that xi = 0 for some i. Then player i gets a payoff of 0. But by choosing
x̂i ∈ (0, 1 − Xt), he can ensure that the cumulative effort X̂t = Xt + x̂i < 1 and thus
X∗t(X̂t) < 1, and the new payoff of player i is strictly positive. This is a contradiction.
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Lemma 6. Xt−1 = ft−1(X) is a necessary condition for equilibrium.
This lemma implies that if X∗ is the total effort in equilibrium, then before the last
period, the cumulative effort had to be X∗T−1 = fT−1(X∗), one period before that X∗T−2 =
fT−2(X∗), and so on. Generally, after period t, the total effort had to be X∗t = ft(X∗).
Therefore, X∗ must satisfy f0(X∗) = X∗0 = 0 and ft(X∗)− ft−1(X∗) =
∑
i∈It x
∗
i ≥ 0.
Proof. By lemma 5, we only need to consider the histories with Xt−1 < 1. Moreover,
we know that each player i ∈ It chooses xi > 0, i.e., an interior solution. Player i’s
maximization problem is
max
xi≥0
xih(X∗t(Xt)),
where X∗t(Xt) is the total effort induced by cumulative effort Xt = Xt−1 +
∑
j∈It xj.
Therefore, a necessary condition for optimum is
h(X∗t(Xt)) + xih′(X∗t(Xt))
dX∗t(Xt)
dXt
= 0.
It is convenient to rewrite this condition in terms of the total effort X, taking into account
that X = X∗t(Xt) = f−1t (Xt), and therefore dX
∗t(Xt)
dXt
= 1
f ′t(X)
to get
xi = −f ′t(X)
h(X)
h′(X) = f
′
t(X)g(X). (22)
Now, we can add up these necessary conditions for all players i ∈ It and take into account
that ft(X) = Xt = Xt−1 +
∑
i∈It xi to get a necessary condition for the equilibrium
Xt−1 = ft(X)− ntf ′t(X)g(X) = ft−1(X).
Lemma 7. Under condition 1, X∗t−1(Xt−1) is well-defined, strictly increasing, X∗t−1(0) =
X t−1 and X∗t−1(1) = 1.
Proof. Note that Xt ≥ Xt−1, so that the total effort induced by Xt−1 can never be lower
than X∗t(Xt−1) ≥ X∗t(0) ≥ X t. Therefore, X < X t cannot be the total effort following
any Xt−1.
Moreover, by condition 1, X t−1 ≥ X t and ft−1(X) < 0 for all X ∈ [X t, X t−1);
therefore, total efforts in this range are not consistent with any Xt−1 either. We get that
the only feasible range of the total effort X induced by cumulative effort Xt−1 is [X t−1, 1].
By condition 1, the function ft−1 is continuously differentiable and strictly increasing in
this range; therefore, the inverse is well-defined, continuously differentiable, and strictly
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increasing. Moreover, since ft−1(1) = 1, we have X∗t−1(1) = 1, and since X t−1 is a root
of ft−1, we have X∗t−1(0) = X t−1.
Lemma 8. The best-response function of player i ∈ It after cumulative effort Xt−1 is
x∗i (Xt−1) =

1
nt
[
ft(f−1t−1(Xt−1))−Xt−1
]
∀Xt−1 < 1,
0 ∀Xt−1 ≥ 1.
(23)
On the equilibrium path the individual efforts are x∗i = 1nt [ft(X
∗)− ft−1(X∗)].
Proof. Lemma 5 proved the claim for any Xt−1 ≥ 1, so let us consider the case Xt−1 <
1. Then by lemma 5, the individual efforts are interior, so they have to satisfy the
individual first-order conditions (22). We showed that the total effort induced by Xt−1 is
X∗t−1(Xt−1) = f−1t−1(Xt−1). Inserting these results into the individual optimality condition
for player i ∈ It we get
x∗i (Xt−1) =
1
nt
[
ft(X∗t−1(Xt−1))− ft−1(X∗t−1(Xt−1))
]
= 1
nt
[
ft(f−1t−1(Xt−1))−Xt−1
]
.
In particular, on the equilibrium path,X = X∗, and therefore x∗i = 1nt [ft(X
∗)− ft−1(X∗)].
The arguments so far show that necessary conditions for equilibria lead to a unique
candidate for equilibrium—the strategies specified in the theorem. Finally, we have to
check that this is indeed an equilibrium. That is, we need to show that all players are
indeed maximizing their payoffs.
Lemma 9. x∗ is an equilibrium.
Proof. By construction x∗i (Xt−1) is a local extremum for player i ∈ It, given that the
cumulative effort prior to period t is Xt−1 and all other players behave according to their
equilibrium strategies. Since the local extremum is unique and ensures strictly positive
payoff (which is strictly more than zero from corner solution xi = 0), x∗i (Xt−1) is also the
global maximum. Thus, no player has an incentive to deviate.
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C Impossibility of standard backward-induction
In this appendix, I show by a simple example45, that a standard backward-induction,
where we compute best-response functions x∗i (Xt−1) backward by plugging them into
the optimization problems of earlier players, is not feasible even in the case of Tullock
payoffs. That is, I show that we cannot explicitly define x∗i (Xt−1) as a function of Xt−1
using standard mathematical operations.
One counterexample is a five-player sequential contest n = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) with Tullock
payoffs. By theorem 1, the best-response of player 2 to x1 ∈ [0, 1) is
x∗2(x1) = f2(f−11 (x1))− x1,where
f2(X) = 6X4 − 6X3 +X2,
f1(X) = 24X5 − 36X4 + 14X3 −X2.
Note that to express x∗2(x1) explicitly, we would have to be able to express f−11 (x1) explic-
itly. I claim that no such expression exists for all x1 ∈ [0, 1). It would have to be a root
of polynomial f1(X)− x1 (in the interval [X2, 1]46), where the coefficients of polynomial
f1(X) are integers from the expression above, but x1 can be any number in [0, 1].
Take for example x1 = 123 . Multiplying f1(X) − x1 by 23 gives us a polynomial with
integer coefficients:
P (X) = 23f1(X)− 1 = 552X5 − 828X4 + 322X3 − 23X2 − 1.
This polynomial has three real roots in (0, 1) and two complex roots. Therefore, Galois
group Gal(P ) contains a transposition. Reducing it, modulo 5 gives
P (X) mod 5 = 2X5 + 2X4 + 2X3 + 2X2 − 1.
This polynomial is irreducible in Z/pZ[X]; therefore, P (X) is irreducible in Q[X]. Hence,
Gal(P ) is S5 and thus not solvable. This means that roots of P (X) are not expressible in
radicals. Therefore, x∗2(x1) cannot have an explicit formula.
Note that finding the equilibrium with the inverted best-response approach poses no
difficulties. The total equilibrium effort is the highest root of
f0(X) = 120X6 − 240X5 + 150X4 − 30X3 +X2,
45I am grateful to Jyotiraditya Singh for help with this example.
46The highest root of f2(X) is X2 = X =
√
3+3
6 ≈ 0.7887.
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which implies
X∗ = 12 +
1
2
√√√√1
2 +
√
7
2
√
15
≈ 0.9587, x∗ ≈ (0.4424, 0.2583, 0.1425, 0.0759, 0.0396).
In this example, X∗ and hence each x∗i can be expressed in terms of radicals, but even
if they could not, it would not pose problems, since we have to find the roots just once
and do not need to substitute the best-response functions to new optimization problems
as with the standard best-response approach.
D Tullock payoffs satisfy condition 2 (proposition 2)
Proof of proposition 2. The proof relies on three lemmas that I prove below.
1. Lemma 10 shows that the highest root of gk is Zk:k = 1, the second highest Zk−1:k ∈
(Zk−2:k−1, 1), and gk(X) > 0 for all X between the highest two roots. Therefore, to
prove that gk(X∗) > 0, it suffices to show that X∗ > Zk−1:k.
2. Lemma 11 establishes a connection between X∗ and Zk−1:k. It shows that if we
take the sequential n-player contest n = (1, . . . , 1), then fn−k(X) = gk(X) X1−X
for all k = 1, . . . , n. Therefore, if we take the k-player sequential contest, we get
f0(X) = gk(X) X1−X , and so the total equilibrium effort X
∗ of this contest is exactly
equal to the second highest root of gk, i.e., Zk−1:k.
This proves the first part of the claim; i.e., if n is fully sequential and k = T = n,
then X∗ = Zn−1:n, which is a root of gn, and therefore gk(X∗) = 0.
3. Lemma 12 shows directly47 that X∗ is strictly increasing in each nt. Therefore, if
the contest is not sequential (i.e., nt > 1 for at least one t), then the total effort
in this contest is strictly higher than in the sequential case, i.e., X∗ > ZT−1:T , and
therefore gT (X∗) > 0.
4. Finally, lemma 10 also shows that the adjacent gk’s are interlaced; i.e., the second
highest roots are increasing in k, so that for all k < T , Zk−1:k < ZT−1:T ≤ X∗, and
therefore gk(X∗) > 0 for all k < T .
Lemma 10. If g(X) = X(1−X), then gk have the following properties for all k ≥ 1:
47Note the first part of corollary 1 proves the same claim, but since proposition 2 establishes a sufficient
condition for theorem 2 and hence its corollary 1, to avoid a circular argument I prove it here directly.
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1. gk(1) = 1.
2. g′k(1) = −1.
3. gk can be expressed as
gk(X) = −
k∏
j=0
(X − Zj:k), (24)
where 0 = Z0:k < Z1:k < · · · < Zk:k = 1.
4. Zs:k+1 ∈ (Zs−1:k, Zs:k) for all s = 1, . . . , k.
Proof. First note that g1(X) = g(X) = X(1−X) is a polynomial of degree 2. Each step of
the recursion gives a polynomial of one degree higher; i.e., gk(X) is a polynomial of degree
k + 1, so g′k(X) is a polynomial of degree k, and therefore gk+1(X) = −g′k(X)X(1 −X)
is a polynomial of degree k + 2.
1. gk+1(1) = −g′k(1)g(1) = 0, because g(1) = 1(1− 1) = 0.
2. g′k(1) = −g′′k−1(1)g(1)−g′(1)g′k−1(1) = g′k−1(1) = · · · = g′1(1) = g′(1) = 1−2·1 = −1.
3. The claim clearly holds for g1(X) = X(1 −X) with Z0:1 = 0 < Z1:1 = 1. Suppose
it holds for k. Since all k + 1 roots of gk are real and in [0, 1], by the Gauss-Lucas
theorem all k roots of g′k are in (0, 1). Then gk+1(X) = −g′k(X)X(1 − X) clearly
has roots at 0 and 1 and k roots in (0, 1). To see that the roots are all distinct, note
that
g′k(X) = −
k∑
s=0
∏
j 6=s
(X − Zj:k).
Therefore, g′k(Zs:k) = −
∏
j 6=s(Zs:k−Zj:k), which is strictly negative for s = k, strictly
positive for s = k−1, and so on. Therefore, for each s = 1, . . . , k, function g′k; hence,
gk+1 also has a root Zs:k+1 = (Zs−1:k, Zs:k). This determines the k interior roots.
4. The previous argument also proves the last claim.
Lemma 11. If n = (1, . . . , 1), then fn−k(X) = gk(X) X1−X for all k = 1, . . . , T .
Proof. Suppose that n = (1, . . . , 1). First, fn−1(X) = X −X(1−X) = X2 = g1(X) X1−X .
Now, suppose that fn−k(X) = gk(X) X1−X . Then since
d X1−X
dX
X(1−X) =
[
1
1−X −
−X
(1−X)2
]
X(1−X) = X(1−X)(1−X)2 =
X
1−X ,
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we get that
fn−(k+1)(X) = fn−k(X)− f ′n−k(X)X(1−X)
= gk(X)
X
1−X − gk(X)
d X1−X
dX
X(1−X)− g′k(X)
X
1−XX(1−X)
= gk+1(X)
X
1−X .
Lemma 12. X∗ is independent of permutations of n and strictly increasing in each nt.
Proof. Fix a contest n and a period t > 1. To shorten the notation, let φ(X) = f ′t(X)g(X).
ft−1(X) = ft(X)− ntf ′t(X)g(X) = ft(X)− ntφ(X),
f ′t−1(X) = f ′t(X)− ntφ′(X) =
φ(X)
g(X) − ntφ
′(X),
ft−2(X) = ft−1(X)− nt−1f ′t−1(X)g(X) = ft(X)− [nt−1 + nt]φ(X) + nt−1ntφ′(X)g(X).
Switching nt−1 and nt in n does not affect ft−2, and therefore it also doesn’t affect f0. This
means that any such switch leaves X∗ unaffected, which means that X∗ is independent
of permutations of n.
To prove that X∗ is strictly increasing in each nt, it therefore suffices to prove that it
is strictly increasing on n1. Now, suppose n̂ = (n1+1, n2, . . . , nT ). Then f1 is unchanged
and the corresponding f̂0 at the original equilibrium X∗ is
f̂0(X∗) = f1(X∗)− (n1 + 1)f ′1(X∗)g(X∗) = f0(X∗)− f ′1(X∗)g(X∗) < 0,
because f0(X∗) = 0, f1(X∗) > 0 by condition 1 and g(X∗) > 0 since X∗ ∈ (0, 1). By
condition 1, f̂0 is strictly increasing between its highest root X̂∗ and 1, thus X̂∗ > X∗.
E Information theorem (theorem 2)
Let nt = (nt+1, . . . , nT ) denote the sub-contest starting after period t. Note that ft(X)
depends only on nt.
Remember that g1, . . . , gT are recursively defined as g1(X) = g(X) and gk+1(X) =
−g′k(X)g(X), so they are independent of n. Also, S(n) = (S1(n), . . . , ST (n)) are defined
so that Sk(n) is the sum of all products of k-combinations of vector n and is therefore
independent of X.
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The key step of the proof of the information theorem involves expressing f0(X) in
terms of information measures S and functions gk. This representation is more general,
holds for any ft(X) and is useful for other results as well, so let me prove this first.
Lemma 13. The function ft(X) can be expressed as
ft(X) = X −
T−t∑
k=1
Sk(nt)gk(X). (25)
Proof. Clearly, fT (X) = X satisfies the condition. Now, suppose that the characterization
holds for ft(X). Then, since gk+1(X) = −g′k(X)g(X), we get that
f ′t(X)g(X) = g(X)− g(X)
T−t∑
k=1
Sk(nt)g′k(X) = g(X) +
T−t+1∑
k=2
Sk−1(nt)gk(X).
Therefore, ft−1(X) = ft(X)− ntf ′t(X)g(X) implies that
ft−1(X) = X −
T−t∑
k=1
Sk(nt)gk(X)− ntg(X)− nt
T−t+1∑
k=2
Sk−1(nt)gk(X)
= X − [S1(nt) + nt]g1(X)−
T−t∑
k=2
[Sk(nt) + ntSk−1(nt)]gk(X)− ntST−t(nt)gT+1(X).
Note that S1(nt) =
∑
s>t ns and g1(X) = g(X), so that S1(nt)+nt = S1(nt−1). Similarly,
nt−1 = (nt,nt), so Sk(nt) includes all k-combinations of nt−1 except the ones involving nt.
Adding ntSk−1(nt) therefore completes the sum, so that Sk(nt−1) = Sk(nt) + ntSk−1(nt).
Since ST−t(nt) = nt+1 . . . nT , we have that ntST−t(nt) = nt × · · · × nT = ST−(t−1)(nt−1).
Therefore, we can express ft−1(X) as
ft−1(X) = X −
T−(t−1)∑
k=1
Sk(nt−1)gk(X).
With this, the proof of the information theorem is now straightforward.
Proof of theorem 2. By theorem 1, the total equilibrium X∗ is the highest root of f0(X)
in [0, 1]. By lemma 13, we can express f0(X∗) as
f0(X∗) = X∗ −
T∑
k=1
Sk(n)gk(X∗).
Now, take another contest n̂ such that S(n̂) > S(n), i.e., Sk(n̂) ≥ Sk(n) for all k and the
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inequality is strict for at least one k ∈ {1, . . . , T}. Then, by condition 2, the corresponding
f̂0 is such that at the original X∗,
f̂0(X∗) = X∗ −
T∑
k=1
Sk(n̂)gk(X∗) < X∗ −
T∑
k=1
Sk(n)gk(X∗) = f0(X∗).
Note that the total equilibrium effort of the new contest, X̂∗, is the highest root of f̂0 and
by condition 1, the function f̂0 is strictly increasing in [X̂∗, 1]. Therefore, X̂∗ > X∗.
F Tullock payoffs imply declining weights (lemma 1)
Proof of lemma 1. By lemma 11, gk(X) = f̂n̂−k(X)1−XX , where f̂n̂−k is defined for a se-
quential n̂ ≥ k-player contest. Similarly, gk−1(X) = f̂n+1−k(X)1−XX . Therefore,
gk−1(X∗)− gk(X∗) = [f̂n̂+1−k(X∗)− f̂n̂−k(X∗)]
1−X∗
X∗
= f̂ ′n̂+1−k(X
∗)(1−X∗)2.
Now, take n̂ = T . Then by lemma 12, X∗ is weakly higher than the highest root of
f̂0. By condition 1, the highest root of f̂T+1−k is even (weakly) lower and f̂T+1−k is
strictly increasing above its highest root, so that f̂ ′
n̂+1−k(X
∗) > 0. This proves that
gk−1(X∗) > gk(X∗).
G Earlier-mover advantage (proposition 3)
Proof of proposition 3. The equilibrium payoff of player i is ui(x∗) = x∗ih(X∗), so the
payoffs are ranked in the same order as the individual efforts (in fact they are proportional
to individual efforts). Therefore, it suffices to prove that if i ∈ It and j ∈ It+1, then
x∗i > x
∗
j . We can express the equilibrium efforts as
x∗i =
1
nt
[ft(X∗)− ft−1(X∗)] = f ′t(X∗)g(X∗),
x∗j =
1
nt+1
[ft+1(X∗)− ft(X∗)] = f ′t+1(X∗)g(X∗).
Using lemma 13, we get that
f ′t(X) = 1−
T−t∑
k=1
Sk(nt)g′k(X) and f ′t+1(X) = 1−
T−t−1∑
k=1
Sk(nt+1)g′k(X).
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Therefore, we can express the difference as
x∗i − x∗j = f ′t(X∗)g(X∗)− f ′t+1(X∗)g(X∗) =
T−t∑
k=1
[
Sk(nt)− Sk(nt+1)
]
gk+1(X∗) > 0,
because Sk(nt) > Sk(nt+1) (there is less information remaining in the game that starts one
period later) and as t ≥ 1, then k+1 ≤ T , so condition 2 implies that gk+1(X∗) > 0.48
H Large contests
In this appendix, I formalize the claim from section 6 and generalize it to arbitrary
payoff functions that satisfy sufficient conditions of the characterization theorem, i.e.,
condition 1. The reason for the result was discussed in section 6. As the number of
players grows, the total equilibrium effort X∗ → 1. By assumptions, payoffs and therefore
g(X) are smooth near X∗; hence, the function g(X) can be well approximated by linear
function near X∗.
Generally −g′(1) = α > 0 and g(1) = 0, so the linear approximation near 1 is α(1−X).
Therefore, g1(X) ≈ α(1−X), so g′1(X) ≈ −α. Then g2(X) = −g′1(X)g(X) ≈ α2(1−X),
so g′2(X) ≈ −α2, and so on. This shows that gk(X) ≈ αk(1−X). Inserting this into (9)
gives
f0(X∗) ≈ 1− (1−X∗)
T∑
k=1
Sk(n)αk = 0 ⇒ 1−X∗ ≈ 1
S(n) ,
where S(n) = ∑Tk=1 Sk(n)αk = ∏Tt=1(1 + αnt) − 1 is the weighted sum of information
measures.
Using lemma 13 and the fact that g′k(X∗) ≈ αk, the individual equilibrium effort of
player i from period t can be expressed as
x∗i =
1
nt
[ft(X∗)− ft−1(X∗)] = g(X∗)f ′t(X∗) ≈ α(1−X∗)
[
1−
T−t∑
k=1
Sk(nt)αk
]
= α(1−X∗)
T∏
s=t+1
(1 + αns) = α
∏T
s=t+1(1 + αns)∏T
s=1(1 + αns)
= α∏t
s=1(1 + αns)
.
Therefore, the individual equilibrium effort is x∗i ≈ αS(n1,...,nt) , where S(·) is again a
weighted sum of the information measures, but only in the subcontest that includes play-
ers up to period t. This means that in contests with linear g function, players’ efforts are
48Note that in case of Tullock payoffs and fully sequential contest, gk+1(X∗) = gT (X∗) = gn(X∗) = 0,
but this does not affect the conclusion, because as long as n > 2, the sum includes at least one more
element and gn−1(X∗) > 0. But in the case of n = 2, we get that the sum equals [S1(n1)−S1(n2)]g2(X∗) =
1× 0 = 0, which we knew, as x∗1 = x∗2 = 14 .
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independent of players arriving after them49.
To make this argument formally, let (nn)n∈N be a sequence of contests, such that
contest nn = (nn1 , . . . , nnTn) has Tn ≤ n periods and n =
∑Tn
t=1 n
n
t players. Moreover,
for each T ∈ N, let nn|T , denote a censored contest, which has a total of n players like
contest nn and has the same first T − 1 disclosures, but all the other disclosures have
been removed.50 That is, nn|T = (nn1 , . . . , nnT−1, nnT+), where nnT+ =
∑Tn
t=T nt. Clearly, if
T > T n, then T does not affect the contest, i.e., nn|T = nn. But when T n > T , then
higher T means a more informative contest, i.e., S(nn) > S(nn|T ) > S(nn|T − 1).
Proposition 4 (Large contests limit). Suppose condition 1 holds. For each T ∈ R
lim
n→∞S(n
n|T )(1−X∗(nn|T )) = 1 (26)
and for each t ≤ T , for each player i in period t,
lim
n→∞x
∗
i (nn|T ) =
α∏t
s=1(1 + αns)
. (27)
Proof. Fix any T and any n. The total equilibrium effort of a censored contest nn|T is
the highest root of f0(X), which can be expressed as
f0(X) = X −
T∑
k=1
Sk(nn|T )gk(X),
where Sk(nn|T ) is the sum of all products of k-combinations of nn|T . Functions gk are
defined as g1(X) = g(X) and gk+1(X) = −g′k(X)g(X). Therefore, for each k, function
g(X) is a twice continuously differentiable function, gk(1) = 0, and
g′k(1) = −g′′k−1(1)g(1)− g′k−1(1)g′(1) = αg′k−1(1) = · · · = αk−1g′1(1) = −αk, (28)
because g(1) = 0 and α = −g′(1). Therefore, for all k > 1,
lim
X→1
gk(X)
αk−1g(X) = limX→1
−g′k−1(X)g(X)
αk−1g(X) =
− limX→1 g′k−1(X)
αk−1
= 1.
We can use Taylor’s theorem to express g(X) = [α− rg(X)](1−X), where the remainder
49For example, in the Stackelberg oligopoly with linear demand, the leader’s quantity is independent
of the number of followers. This observation has been made before, for example by Anderson and Engers
(1992); Julien et al. (2012). In fact, Julien et al. (2012) derived this equilibrium characterization for
arbitrary sequential oligopolies with linear demand (which implies α = 1 here).
50Equivalently, it is identical to nn in the first T − 1 periods, but all remaining players are collected
into period T .
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term satisfies limX→1 rg(X) = 0. Therefore, equation (28) implies that
lim
n→∞X
∗(nn|T ) = 1 = lim
n→∞
T∑
k=1
Sk(nn|T )gk(X∗(nn|T ))
= lim
n→∞
[
1 + rg(X
∗(nn|T ))
α
]
S(nn|T )(1−X∗(nn))
×
T∑
k=1
αkSk(nn|T )
S(nn|T )
gk(X∗(nn|T ))
αk−1g(X∗(nn|T ))
= lim
n→∞S(n
n|T )(1−X∗(nn)),
where
S(nn|T ) =
T∑
k=1
αkSk(nn|T ) =
T−1∏
s=1
(1 + αnns )(1 + αnnT+)− 1
is the weighted sum of all the measures of information. For individual efforts, let us take
individual i from period t ≤ T ; then
x∗i (nn|T ) =
1
nnt
[ft(X∗(nn|T ))− ft−1(X∗(nn|T ))] = g(X∗(nn|T ))f ′t(X∗(nn|T )).
Note that we can express ft(X) as
ft(X) = X −
T−t∑
k=1
Sk((nn|T )t)gk(X),
where (nn|T )t = (nnt+1, . . . , nnT−1, nnT+). By the results above, limn→∞ S(nn|T )g(X
∗(nn|T ))
α
=
limn→∞ S(nn|T )(1−X∗(nn)) = 1. Therefore, we get that
lim
n→∞x
∗
i (nn|T ) = limn→∞ g(X
∗(nn|T ))− lim
n→∞ g(X
∗(nn|T ))
T−t∑
k=1
Sk((nn|T )t)g′k(X∗(nn|T ))
= lim
n→∞S(n
n|T )g(X∗(nn|T ))
T−t∑
k=1
αkSk((nn|T )t)
S(nn|T )
g′k(X∗(nn|T )
−αk
= lim
n→∞α
T−t∑
k=1
αkSk((nn|T )t)
S(nn|T ) = limn→∞α
∏T−1
s=t+1(1 + αnns )(1 + αnnT+)− 1∏T−1
s=1 (1 + αnns )(1 + αnnT+)− 1
= α∏t
s=1(1 + αnns )
.
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I General payoffs
The general payoff function where the results apply is ui(x) = xih(X), where h(X) is
the marginal benefit of individual effort, which is a smooth and decreasing function of
the total effort. In particular, I assume that h : R+ → R is a (T + 1)-times continuously
differentiable strictly decreasing function with h(X) = 0 for some X <∞. Without loss
of generality, we can normalize X = 1, so that h(1) = 0.
Instead of the h(X) function, the relevant function for the equilibrium characterization
is g(X) = − h(X)
h′(X) , which is the function that enters into the optimality conditions. Then
g(X) is T -times continuously differentiable, g(1) = 0, and g(X) > 0 for all X ∈ (0, 1).
I have already described sufficient conditions for the results. For the characterization
theorem, the sufficient condition was condition 1, which guarantees that the inverted
best-response functions are well-behaved. Although the condition is not directly defined
on primitives, it is a mathematical property of function g that can be easily verified.
Condition 1 is not a necessary condition, but it is constructed in a way that identi-
fies situations where the analysis may fail if the condition is not satisfied. Part 3 (i.e.,
increasing ft), guarantees that the inverted best-response functions ft are invertible and
therefore that the best-response functions are well-defined. Parts 1 and 2 guarantee that
there is a unique combination of efforts that satisfy the individual first-order conditions
which ensures the uniqueness of the equilibrium. The existence is guaranteed by two
parts. First, it is crucial that the highest root of f0(X) is strictly positive because oth-
erwise, all necessary conditions cannot be satisfied at the same time, and thus there are
no pure-strategy equilibria. Second, assuming that there exist effort levels that satisfy
individual first-order necessary conditions, they are also sufficient, because it is a unique
local extremum which guarantees strictly higher payoff than the corner solution (which
gives zero payoff) and is thus also global maximizer.
Conditions 1 and 2 jointly are sufficient conditions for theorem 2, all its corollaries,
and the earlier-mover advantage. Again, the conditions are not necessary, but they are
constructed in a way that makes it clear why the information theorem may not hold
without these assumptions. The result relies on the characterization from theorem 1, so
if condition 1 is not satisfied, then the result may not hold. Moreover, the proof uses
condition 1 directly; it shows that X∗ increases because f0(X) is increasing above its
highest root. Condition 2 is used in a transparent way as well: if efforts were strategic
complements on some level, then contests that increase information at these levels may
reduce the total effort. Appendix K.5 provides an example.
It is natural to ask whether there are standard payoff functions other than Tullock
payoffs that satisfy conditions 1 and 2. Appendix J describes a class of standard functional
51
form assumptions for which both conditions are always satisfied: completely monotone
functions and T -times monotone functions. Appendix K provides a few examples: ap-
pendix K.1 contains Tullock payoffs; in appendices K.2 and K.3 function g is completely
monotone, whereas in appendix K.4 it is neither Tullock nor monotone. Finally, in Ap-
pendix K.5 condition 1 is violated, and there are no equilibria.
J T-times monotone payoff functions
A class of payoff functions, where conditions 1 and 2 can be relatively easily verified, are
payoffs with T -times monotone g functions. Monotonicity assumptions are convenient,
since checking the signs everywhere is usually simpler than checking signs in relevant
(typically endogenous) ranges, and the same is true here. To make a connection with the
standard assumptions, note that in a simultaneous contest where T = 1, the assumption
only requires that g(X) = − h(X)
h′(X) is decreasing in X. Since
d log h(X)
dX
= h′(X)
h(X) = − 1g(X) ,
this assumption is equivalent to assuming that h(X) is log-concave. This is a standard
assumption in most applications with simultaneous decisions and guarantees that each
player chooses an interior optimum.
In dynamic contests we have to extend the assumption to higher-order impacts, and
T -times monotonicity is easy to verify and is satisfied in many standard functional form
assumptions, including many polynomial, exponential, and logarithmic functions. Also,
sums and products of T -times monotone functions are T -times monotone, so the class of
functional forms satisfying the assumption is very large.
A function g is T -times monotone51 (or multiply monotone) in [0, 1] if it is T -times
continuously differentiable in [0, 1], and satisfies
(−1)k d
kg(X)
dXk
≥ 0, ∀X ∈ [0, 1], ∀k ≤ T. (29)
Function g is completely monotone (or totally monotone) if it is m-times monotone for
any m ∈ N.
There are many functions that are completely monotone or T -times monotone. Lem-
mas 14 and 15 give a few examples, and lemma 16 shows that all sums and products of
T -times monotone functions are also T -times monotone.
Lemma 14. The following functions are completely monotone in [0, 1] for any α > 0
1. g(X) = α(1−Xm) for any m ∈ N
51By definition, a function could be either increasing or decreasing and T -times monotone, but since I
assume that g(X) > 0 for X ∈ (0, 1) and g(X) < 0 for X > 1, this means that g must be decreasing.
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2. g(X) = α(1−X)m for any m ∈ N,
3. g(X) = α((X + γ)s − (1 + γ)s) for any s < 0, γ > 0,
4. g(X) = α[e−rX − e−r] for any r > 0,
5. g(X) = −α log(X).
Lemma 15. Function g(X) = α[(1+ γ−X)m−ε− γm−ε] with α > 0, γ > 0 and ε ∈ (0, 1)
is m-times monotone, but not (m+ 1)-times monotone.
Let me also introduce some few very useful well-known properties ofm-times monotone
functions.
Lemma 16. If g(X) and f(X) are decreasing m-times monotone functions, then
1. g(X) is a decreasing m̂-times monotone function for each m̂ < m.
2. ag(X) is a decreasing m-times monotone function for all a ≥ 0 and an increasing
m-times monotone function for all a ≤ 0.
3. g(X) + f(X) is a decreasing m-times monotone function.
4. g(X)f(X) is an decreasing m-times monotone function.
5. −g′(X) is a decreasing (m− 1)-times monotone function.
6.
∫ a
X g(t)dt is a decreasing (m+1)-times monotone function in [0, a] g(X) ≥ 0 for all
X ∈ [0, a].
Proposition 5 (T -times monotone g satisfies condition 1). If g is T -times monotone in
[0, 1], then condition 1 is satisfied.
Proof. It is first useful to show that each ft inherits the monotonicity properties of g.
Lemma 17. If g is T -times monotone in [0, 1], then each ft(X) is a strictly increasing
(t+ 1)-times monotone function in [0, 1].
Proof. First, fT (X) = X is strictly increasing and completely monotone, so also (T + 1)-
times monotone. Suppose that ft(X) is a strictly increasing (t + 1)-times monotone
function. Then f ′t(X) is a decreasing t-times monotone function. Therefore, f ′t(X)g(X)
is a product of a two decreasing t-times monotone function and thus is also a decreas-
ing t-times monotone function. Then −ntf ′t(X)g(X) is an increasing t-times monotone
function. Finally,
ft−1(X) = ft(X)− ntf ′t(X)g(X)
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is the sum of two increasing t-times monotone functions. Finally, since −ntf ′t(X)g(X) is
an increasing function, we have that
f ′t−1(X) = f ′t(X) +
d(−ntf ′t(X)g(X))
dX
≥ f ′t(X) ≥ · · · ≥ f ′T (X) = 1 > 0.
Therefore, ft−1(X) is a strictly increasing t-times monotone function.
With this, we can prove the claim by induction. Clearly all assumptions of condition 1
are satisfied for fT (X) = X. Suppose that they are satisfied for ft and we need to show
that they are also then satisfied for ft−1(X). By lemma 17, each ft(X) is a strictly
increasing ((t+ 1)-times monotone) function in [0, 1], thus f ′t(1) <∞, we get
ft−1(1) = ft(1)− ntf ′t(1)g(1) = ft(1) = . . . = fT (1) = 1
Moreover, at X t,
ft−1(X t) = ft(X t)− ntf ′t(X t)g(X t) ≤ 0,
as ft(X t) = 0, f ′t(X t) > 0 (since ft is strictly increasing) and g(X t) ≥ 0. As ft−1 is strictly
increasing and continuous in [0, 1], it must have exactly one root in X t−1 ∈ [X t, 1).
Finally, since ft−1(X) is strictly increasing in [0, 1], we must have that ft−1(X) <
ft−1(X t−1) = 0 for all X ∈ [X t, X t−1) and f ′t−1(X) > 0 for all X ∈ [X t−1, 1].
Proposition 6 (T -times monotone g satisfies condition 2). If g is T -times monotone in
[0, 1], then condition 2 is satisfied.
Proof. I first show by induction that gk is a strictly decreasing (T +1−k)-times monotone
function in [0, 1]. It is clearly true for g1(X) = g(X). Suppose that this is true for k.
Then gk+1(X) = −g′k(X)g(X) is strictly decreasing, as
g′k+1(X) = −g′′k(X)g(X)− g′k(X)g′(X) < 0,
because g′′k(X) ≥ 0, g(X) ≥ 0, g′k(X) < 0 and g′(X) < 0. It is also (T − k)-times
monotone as for all m ≤ T − k
(−1)md
mgk+1(X)
dXm
= (−1)m+1d
m+1gk(X)
dXm+1
g(X)(−1)md
mgk+1(X)
dXm
(−g′(X)) ≥ 0,
because (−1)m+1 dm+1gk(X)
dXm+1 ≥ 0 and (−1)md
mgk+1(X)
dXm
(−g′(X)) ≥ 0 , since gk is at least
(m+ 1)-times monotone, g(X) ≥ 0, and −g′(X) > 0.
Now, note that gk(1) = 0 for all k. Since X∗ ∈ (0, 1) and gk is strictly decreasing in
[0, 1], we get that gk(X∗) > gk(1) = 0.
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K Examples
K.1 Example: Tullock contest with four players
Let us take a three-period four-player contest n = (1, 2, 1). Starting from f3(X) = X and
applying the formula ft−1(X) = ft(X)− ntf ′t(X)X(1−X) three times, we get
f2(X) = X −X(1−X) = X2,
f1(X) = X2 − 2(2X)X(1−X) = X2(4X − 3),
f0(X) = X2(4X − 3)− (12X2 − 6X)X(1−X) = X2(12X2 − 14X + 3).
The highest root of f0(X) is the total equilibrium effort X∗ = 112
(√
13 + 7
)
≈ 0.8838.
The individual efforts can be computed as x∗i = 1nt [ft(X
∗)− ft−1(X∗)]. In particular,
x∗1 =
1
432
(√
13− 2
) (√
13 + 7
)2 ≈ 0.4180,
x∗2 = x∗3 =
1
864
(
5−√13
) (√
13 + 7
)2 ≈ 0.1815,
x∗4 =
1
144
(
5−√13
) (√
13 + 7
)
≈ 0.1027.
K.2 Example: linear g
Perhaps the simplest class of payoff functions is h(X) = d α
√
1−X with d, α > 0, because
this implies linear g(X) = α(1 − X), which is clearly completely monotone. By the
argument in appendix H, the total equilibrium effort in this case can be simply (exactly)
calculated as X∗ = 1− 1
S(n) , where S(n) =
∑T
k=1 Sk(n)αk, and the individual equilibrium
efforts are x∗i = α∏t
s=1(1+αns)
.
K.3 Example: completely monotone g
Suppose that n = (1, 2, 1) and h(X) = d α
√
c− bX , where α > 0, b > 1, c > 0, and d > 0.
Then h(X) = 0 defines X = logb c. Without loss of generality, we can rescale X such that
X = 1, which implies c = b. Then
g(X) = − h(X)
h′(X) = −
c(b− bX) 1a
c 1
a
(b− bX) 1a−1(− log b)bX = α
b1−X − 1
log b (30)
and (−1)k dkg(X)
dXk
= α(log b)k−1b1−X > 0 for all X and all k. Therefore, g is completely
monotone and condition 1 is satisfied. Note that α = −g′(1). Applying the characteriza-
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tion result gives
f3(X) = X,
f2(X) = X − αb
1−X − 1
log b ,
f1(X) = X −
(
3α + 2α2b1−X
) b1−X − 1
log b
f0(X) = X −
(
4α + 5α2b1−X + 2α3(2b1−X − 1)b1−X
) b1−X − 1
log b .
Since g is completely monotone, lemma 17 implies that each ft is strictly increasing and
proposition 5 implies that the roots satisfy 0 = X3 < X2 < X1 < X0 = X∗ < 1.
For particular parameter values, it is straightforward to compute the equilibrium nu-
merically. For example, let α = 12 and b = 2, so that g(X) = α
b1−X−1
log b =
2−X−2−1
log 2 , then
X2 ≈ 0.3841, X1 ≈ 0.7015, and X0 ≈ 0.8030. Therefore, the total equilibrium effort is
X∗ = X0 ≈ 0.8030, and the individual efforts are x∗ ≈ (0.3653, 0.1661, 0.1661, 0.1056).
Figure 5 illustrates the functions in this case.
X
ft(X)
X3 X2 X1 X0
Figure 5: Illustration in the case n = (1, 2, 1), g(X) = α b1−X−1log b , α =
1
2 , and b = 2.
K.4 Example: an oligopoly with logarithmic demand
Take an oligopoly with n1 leaders and n2 followers, inverse demand P (X) = 1 − logX,
and marginal cost c = 1. Then h(X) = − logX and g(X) = − h(X)
h′(X) = −X logX, which is
neither a Tullock payoff nor monotone. Therefore, we have to verify condition 1 directly.
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Applying the recursive rule gives
f2(X) = X,
f1(X) = X(1 + n2 logX),
f0(X) = X(1 + (n1 + n2 + n1n2) logX + n1n2(logX)2).
Figure 6 depicts the functions. The highest root of f1(X) is the solution to 1+n2 logX = 0,
which is X1 = e
− 1
n2 > X2 = 0, and f1(X) is negative in [0, X1] and strictly increasing in
[X1, 1].
X
ft(X)
X2 X1 X0
Figure 6: Illustration of condition 1 in the case n = (2, 2) and g(X) = −X logX. Line
segments marked with circles are negative and line segments marked with plusses are
strictly increasing.
Now, the expression in the parenthesis of f0(X) is a quadratic function of logX that
has two roots, both in (0, 1). The function f0 is strictly increasing above its highest root,
so to verify condition 1 it suffices to verify that at f0(X1) < 0. Since logX1 = − 1n2 , this
is equivalent to
f0(X1) = X1
1
n2
(n2 − n1 − n2 − n1n2 + n1) = −n1X1 < 0
Now, the highest root of f0(X) is the solution to
1 + (n1 + n2 + n1n2) logX + n1n2(logX)2 = 0,
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which is a quadratic equation of logX and gives
logX0 =
√
(n+ p)2 − 4p− (n+ p)
2p ⇐⇒ X0 = e
√
(n+p))2−4p−(n+p)
2p ,
where n = n1 + n2 and p = n1n2. Then X0 > X1, f0(X) < 0 between and strictly
increasing above X0. The equilibrium effort is X∗ = X0
For example, if n1 = n2 = 2, then X∗ = e
√
3
2 −1 ≈ 0.8746. On the other hand, if all 4
players were to make simultaneous decisions, then the equilibrium would be X∗ = e− 14 ≈
0.7788. If n = (1, 3) or n = (3, 1), then X∗ = e
√
37−7
6 ≈ 0.8582.52
K.5 Example: payoffs that do not satisfy necessary conditions
Suppose that the payoff function is h(X) =
[
1−X
X
]2
. Then
g1(X) = g(X) =
1
2X(1−X),
g2(X) = −g′1(X)g(X) =
1
4X(2X − 1)(1−X),
g3(X) = −g′2(X)g(X) =
1
8X(6X
2 − 6X + 1)(1−X),
g4(X) = −g′3(X)g(X) =
1
16X(2X − 1)(12X
2 − 12X + 1)(1−X).
With these functions, it is straightforward to illustrate multiple possibilities illustrating
how the results may not hold if condition 1 or condition 2 is not satisfied.
Consider first the two-player simultaneous contest n = (2). Then
f0(X) = X − 2g1(X) = X2.
Therefore, the highest root is X0 = 0, which means that condition 1 is not satisfied, and
thus theorem 1 does not apply. Indeed, the individual optimization problem is
max
xi≥0
xi
[ 1
x1 + x2
− 1
]2
⇒ x∗i (x−i) =
1
2
[√
8x−i + 1− 2x−i − 1
]
,∀x−i ∈ (0, 1].
From this, it is straightforward to check that there are no equilibria in pure strategies
with x1, x2 > 0. However, by the assumption payoff from xi = 0 is 0, so (0, 0) cannot be
an equilibrium either, because any xi > 0 is then a profitable deviation.
52The corresponding individual efforts are x∗((2, 2)) ≈ (0.3201, 0.3201, 0.1172, 0.1172), x∗((4)) ≈
(0.1947, 0.1947, 0.1947, 0.1947), x∗((1, 3)) ≈ (0.4646, 0.1312, 0.1312, 0.1312), and x∗((3, 1)) ≈
(0.2423, 0.2423, 0.2423, 0.1312).
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Consider now, a simultaneous four-player contest n = (4), such that
f0(X) = X − 4g1(X) = 2X
(
X − 12
)
.
The total equilibrium effort is X∗ = 12 and the individual efforts are x
∗
i = 18 . If we take a
four-player two-period contest, i.e. n̂ = (n̂1, n̂2) such that n̂1 + n̂2 = 4, then
f̂0(X) = X − 4g1(X)− n1n2g2(X),
which has the same highest root (i.e., X̂∗ = 12 , and individual efforts are x
∗
i = 18 . It is
straightforward to verify that in all these cases, condition 1 is satisfied, but since g2(12) = 0,
condition 2 is not satisfied. Indeed, we see that the additional disclosure in n̂ compared
to n does not increase total effort and there is no earlier-mover advantage.
The result is even starker if we add another disclosure, for example when n̂ = (1, 2, 1),
then S(n̂) = (4, 5, 2) and so
f̂0(X) = X − 4g1(X)− 5g2(X)− 3g3(X) = 32X
3
(
X − 13
)
.
Therefore, the total equilibrium effort is X̂∗ = 13 <
1
2 and the individual efforts are
x∗1 = 127 < x
∗
2 = x∗3 = 554 < x
∗
4 = 19 . That is, the additional disclosure decreases total
effort and there is a strict later-mover advantage. Again, it is straightforward to check that
condition 1 is satisfied, but condition 2 is not, as g2
(
1
3
)
= − 154 < 0 and g3
(
1
3
)
= − 1108 < 0.
Finally, if we add the final possible disclosure to get the sequential four-player contest
n̂ = (1, 1, 1, 1), then S(n̂) = (4, 6, 4, 1), so that
f̂0(X) = X − 4g1(X)− 6g2(X)− 4g3(X)− g4(X) = X16(24X
4− 12X3+2X2− 31X +33).
The polynomial 24X4 − 12X3 + 2X2 − 31X + 33 > 0 for all X ∈ R, so it cannot have
any real roots in [0, 1]. Therefore, the highest root of f0(X) = 0 and thus there are no
equilibria in pure strategies (and condition 1 is not satisfied).
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